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Executive Summary 
 
The management of legacy and low volume products is an important issue for many 
businesses.  With companies fighting to remain competitive in the difficult economic 
climate, there arguably is an increased pressure to keep assets in service for longer and 
to increase the return on investment made in them.  The result of this is that for 
companies supporting these products, there is an increased requirement for legacy 
components.  The overall aim of this report is to critically review the supply chain 
management of legacy and low volume parts in Rolls-Royce and to compare this against 
the literature and cases form the literature in order to determine if there are 
improvements that could be made to the Rolls-Royce approach.   
 
In order to meet the research aims, interviews were conducted with senior managers 
from the Civil, Marine and Defence sectors of the business and questionnaires were 
distributed to various buyers.  Literature on the subject of legacy and low volume supply 
chains and aftermarket supply chains was reviewed in order to find appropriate models 
and case studies as a basis for suggestions for improvements to the approach taken by 
Rolls-Royce. 
 
The result of the research is that it has been highlighted that legacy and low volume 
components are an important part of the business due to the profit opportunities, the 
need to maintain the brand images and the requirement to support defence customers 
like the Ministry of Defence.  The views from around the business were consistent in the 
belief that there are problems with the way these components are managed and that 
improvement could be made. 
 
The key finding from the research was that legacy and low volume components should 
not be treated in the same way as running higher volume production components.  The 
demand and supply drivers for the different types of parts should lead the company to 
set up different types of supply chains which is currently not the case.  The report 
concludes with a suggested reference framework intended to guide thinking on the future 
management of legacy and low volume components in the company.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Legacy and Low Volume Parts 
The management of legacy and low volume products is an important issue for many 
businesses.  Legacy products are defined by Rolls-Royce internally as being those that 
support “engines that are no longer in production, engines approaching end of new 
production, and engines in low volume of new production with a non-robust supply 
chain.” (Rolls-Royce, 2011a). More generally, a definition for a legacy system captures 
the overall concept that:  
 
“A legacy system is an old method, technology, computer system, or application program 
that continues to be used, typically because it still functions for the users' needs, even 
though newer technology or more efficient methods of performing a task are now 
available.” (Anon, 2011b). 
 
The concept of what is low volume will naturally differ according to the industry and even 
the company in question, and therefore setting an exact figure is difficult and could 
perhaps be misleading.  The volumes considered as high volume within Rolls-Royce and 
the rest of the aerospace industry are relatively low volume in comparison to products in 
the fast moving consumer goods market and compared to the automobile industry (for 
new production).  Low volume components in Rolls-Royce are most often aftermarket 
components, however some of the sectors that Rolls-Royce operates in, for example 
Marine and Nuclear have low volumes even for new production.  Often due to their 
nature, legacy components are low volume because inevitably as newer technologies 
come along, customers purchase these rather than previous versions.  
 
To illustrate the idea of low volume within Rolls-Royce; projects such as the Marine 
Olympus and the Marine Tyne in the Naval Marine sector of the Rolls-Royce business 
have demands of around 9 engines and 12 engines per year respectively which is 
considered as being low volume. Conversely, a running engine programme for Civil 
aerospace like the Trent 700, the engine used on the Airbus A330, has demands of up to 
12 a month, and this would be considered as a high volume. 
 
As noted above, legacy and low volume parts are most often aftermarket components, 
although some exceptions were given of low volume new production.  For this report, the 
focus will be on the aftermarket element and it will be assumed that where aftermarket 
is mentioned this refers to legacy and low volume. 
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1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The overall aim of this report is to critically review the supply chain management of 
legacy and low volume parts in Rolls-Royce and to compare this against the literature 
and cases form the literature in order to determine if there are improvements that could 
be made to the Rolls-Royce approach. 
 
Objectives supporting this aim are: 
1. To illustrate the importance of legacy and low volume parts to Rolls-Royce and to 
understand the scale of the problems in their management 
2. To gain views from the different business sectors in Rolls-Royce as to what issues 
there are currently in the business 
3. To review the literature on the subject of legacy and low volume parts in order to 
identify best practice concepts, methods and techniques 
4. To critically review how Rolls-Royce currently manages legacy and low volume 
parts 
5. To analyse the gaps between what is done in Rolls-Royce currently and what is 
done in other companies according to the literature, in order to identify relevant 
areas for improvement 
6. To develop a framework to guide future thinking in Rolls-Royce on the 
management of legacy and low volume parts 
 
1.3 Report Structure 
The next section of this report will explain the research approach taken.  The following 
section will introduce Rolls-Royce and the context for researching the problems 
associated with managing legacy and low volume parts. Section 4 will be the literature 
review, followed by some case examples in section 5.  A review of the current Roll-Royce 
approach to managing legacy and low volume parts will be the focus for section 6.  The 
remaining two sections will be focussed on the analysis of the research and the 
development of a framework to guide future thinking in Rolls-Royce on the management 
of legacy and low volume parts, concluding with suggestions for further research.  
 
 8 
2. Methodology  
2.1 Overall Approach 
A variety of techniques will be used to obtain the required information for this report in 
line with the set aim and objectives.  The overall approach is summarised in figure 1 
which shows that the overall subject of legacy and low volume supply chains has been 
split into four areas, Customer Requirements, Sourcing, Manufacture and Delivery to 
customer.  The reason for this is to logically separate out the important areas to be 
covered.  When talking about legacy and low volume supply chains there are other areas 
such as design, technical issues and repair and overhaul to name a few, however, the 
areas identified in figure 1 are intended to set the scope for this report and to provide 
boundaries for the research to ensure that the aim and objectives identified in section 
1.2 are met.   
 
The majority of this research will be qualitative and will be a mixture of primary and 
secondary data.  The nature of the study is not necessarily about quantifying data; the 
focus is around a management process and the behaviours around this.  That said, some 
data will be analysed in the next section where the scale of the problem in Rolls-Royce 
will be discussed. 
 
Figure 1: Research Approach 
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2.2 Interviews 
The intention is to interview senior Supply Chain Planning and Control (SCP&C) Managers 
from different sectors of the customer facing business to gain an insight into their 
viewpoint, this will support the first, second and fifth objectives stated in section 1.2.  
The interviews will be semi-structured, this means that the questions will be initially used 
to guide the discussion; a copy of these questions can be found in appendix 1.  To 
support objective 4, some additional interviews will also be undertaken but these will not 
be guided by specific questions, these will be aimed at finding out further general 
information about certain areas for example Post Production Engine Services (PPES), 
these will be what Fisher (2007) would describe as open interviews. 
 
This approach is discussed by Fisher (2007) who argues that a less structured approach 
is useful when new ideas are being sought and where it is not clear what answers will be 
given.  The idea of having a guide for the discussion is suggested by Fisher (2007), he 
discusses the fact that interviews can range from being totally open where the discussion 
is not guided to very structured where the interviewer will keep to a script.  As stated 
above the approach to be taken for this study is to semi-structure the interviews to 
ensure that the content is kept in line with the boundaries of the report.  Notes will be 
taken in the interviews and will be written up following each interview; a summary of all 
notes made can also be found in appendix 2.  Fisher (2007) does note that recording 
interviews can be useful; however in this instance this was not practical. The results of 
the interviews along with the questionnaire results will be discussed partly in section 3 to 
support objectives 1 and 2, and more fully in section 6 to support objectives 4 and 5. 
 
Naturally there are limitations to note, and for a semi structured approach there is 
always the danger that important issues could be missed if the interviews are not guided 
in the right way or if the list of outline topics does not actually yield the information 
required.  This was deemed as an acceptable risk but must be noted as a potential 
limitation. 
 
2.3 Questionnaire 
In order to obtain views on the sourcing and manufacturing of legacy and low volume 
parts, a questionnaire will also be distributed to a selection of buyers working within 
different supply chain units in Rolls-Royce.  These questions will cover sourcing, 
manufacture and delivery to the customer and a copy of the questions can be found in 
appendix 3.  The questionnaires will be distributed by email and follow up phone calls will 
be used if the response rate is below 50%. 
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These questionnaires will be what Fisher (2007) would describe as open.  He notes that 
questionnaires, like interviews, can be open or “pre-coded”.  As general opinions and 
examples were being sought in this instance, it was determined that open questions 
allowing the respondents to provide as much information as they felt relevant was the 
best approach.  A summary of the responses can be found in appendix 4 and the results 
will be discussed as part of section 6 of this report. 
 
The limitation to note in this is that there is the risk that questions could be 
misunderstood and therefore the information may not be useful for analysis.  The 
mitigation for this is that if there are any unclear answers the author will contact the 
respondents and discuss the questions to aid in clarifying the points raised.  In terms of 
selecting participants, the ideal way to do this would be to take a random sample of 
buyers across the company, however this was not feasible.  The approach taken was to 
distribute this to buyers known to the author and to any further people suggested by 
these contacts.  This does mean that the responses will be confined to certain areas of 
the business and this limitation has to be noted also. 
 
2.4 Literature and Case Studies 
To support the third stated objective to understand the current thinking in the literature 
on the subject of legacy and low volume parts management, a variety of sources will be 
reviewed; these include journal articles, media reports, case studies and textbooks. 
Literature on the subject of aftermarket supply chains will be reviewed along with 
literature specific to legacy and low volume supply chains and literature on supply chain 
design.  The literature will be used to identify different practices with regards to 
managing legacy and low volume supply chains in different industries.  The structure of 
the literature review will be to firstly review the perceived importance of legacy and low 
volume parts, then to understand the current issues and problems with the management 
of legacy and low volume parts and finally to review current thinking on models for 
supply chain management that are stated as being applicable to legacy and low volume 
supply chains or to supply chain design in general where principles may be applicable to 
legacy and low volume supply chains. 
 
The aim of using case studies and researching other companies and other industries is an 
attempt to benchmark the Rolls-Royce process for managing legacy and low volume 
parts.  Lewis & Naim (1995) give some good guidance on benchmarking which are useful 
to consider when looking at similar industries to benchmark the legacy and low volume 
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supply chains.  They cite four types of benchmarking; Internal, Competitive, Parallel 
industry, and Best practice company.  All of these types of benchmarking will be 
considered, although internal is likely to be less useful unless there is a particular area in 
the company that is operating a better process than other areas.  Competitive, Parallel 
industry and best practice company benchmarking will be the basis of the literature 
review and case studies.  Lewis and Naim (1995) note the benefits of benchmarking and 
these can be found in appendix 8 
 
They state that; “it is important that when comparable industries are identified, factors 
such as customer requirements, product characteristics and output usage are taken into 
account”.  These elements will be borne in mind when researching alternative industries 
and companies.  In order to facilitate the identification of similar industries for 
comparative studies it is important to define the characteristics of the industry in which 
Rolls-Royce operates.  Rolls-Royce operates in five key markets, Civil Aerospace, Defence 
Aerospace, Marine, Energy and Nuclear.  All of these are capital-intensive industries with 
high barriers to entry.  Products are high value and have long lifecycles and for the most 
part, the amount of competition in these markets is relatively small, most likely due to 
the high barriers to entry.  For example in the large civil engines market aside from 
Rolls-Royce there are only two other main competitors, General Electric (GE) and Pratt 
and Whitney (P&W).   
 
Fisher (2007) notes that case studies can be a useful source of information as they 
provide a ‘holistic’ view.  Fisher (2007) does state that; “It cannot be claimed that what 
happened in one case is typical of all cases. In many instances the power of the case 
study lies in its capacity to provide insights”, this limitation is understood and it is the 
intention that case studies will be used exactly as Fisher suggests, to provide insights but 
not necessarily to generalise. 
 
2.5 First Hand Research in Rolls-Royce 
Finally, in addition to the interviews and questionnaires, research will be conducted 
internally to Rolls-Royce.  This will be done by reviewing information on the company 
intranet, researching parts on the SAP system and also by reviewing various process 
documents and relevant data that the author has access to. In addition to this, personal 
knowledge of the author based on working in the company will be used.  
 
The intention is that by conducting the research outlined above covering all of the areas 
highlighted in figure 1, with the combination of primary data from the interviews, 
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questionnaires and experience of the author, and the secondary data from the literature 
review and case studies, the objectives of the report will be met. 
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3. Business Context and Problem Definition 
 
Before commencing with the literature review, some background information will be 
provided.  The aim of this section is to respond to the first and second stated objectives 
of illustrating the importance of legacy and low volume parts to Rolls-Royce and 
understanding the scale of the problems with legacy and low volume supply chains in 
Rolls-Royce.  
3.1 The Product Introduction and Lifecycle Management Process (PILM) 
As explained in the introduction, legacy and low volume components are most often 
associated with the aftermarket in Rolls-Royce.  Figure 2 illustrates the majority of the 
engine projects in Rolls-Royce plotted against their position in the Product Introduction 
and Lifecycle Management (PILM) process.  The PILM process is a gated process used by 
Rolls-Royce to manage engine projects from initial concept through to end of life.   
Figure 2: PILM graph (Rolls-Royce 2010a) 
 
There is a dotted line on the graph at gate 4.2 and this is the point at which an engine 
ceases to be produced and where it is then known as a post-production engine.  After 
gate 4.2, engine components are only required for the aftermarket and not for new 
engine build.  As can be seen from the graph, there are numerous engine projects at this 
point in their lifecycle.  This diagram does not indicate which programmes would be 
considered as low volume (that are not already post-production) however the assumption 
used in this report is that any Marine programme is low volume regardless of the stage 
at which it sits in the PILM process 
 
 14 
Rolls-Royce is committed to supporting all products until the end of their life.  This can 
mean that for those engine projects that were originally produced decades ago, for 
example from the graph it can be seen that projects such as the Dart, the Tyne and the 
Conway are far past gate 4.2, a demand could arise for a spare part to support an engine 
that is in service somewhere in the world even years after the engine has ceased to be 
produced.   
 
3.2 Quantifying the Problem 
To illustrate the scale of the issue of legacy and low volume parts, some research was 
done to understand how many new legacy and low volume parts are added to the list of 
parts requiring a source each week.  Analysis was also done to understand how many of 
the late parts in the company are legacy and low volume parts. 
Figure 3: PPES New Work Queue Parts 
Taken from the PPES department in Rolls-Royce 
 
The graph in figure 3 above is taken from the Post Production Engine Services (PPES) 
department in Roll-Royce and it shows the number of new legacy and low volume parts 
being added to the buyers work queues each week for the first part of 2011.  This graph 
is a standard report however it has been annotated to show the fact that the data from 
the graph was analysed to show that rate of closure (i.e. sourcing) is less than the rate 
of new parts being added.  As can be seen, there is a steady stream of these parts being 
added each week, each one requiring the attention of a buyer to find a suitable source 
and ensure delivery on time to customer requirements.   
 
Total New = 378 
Total Closed = 266 
 15 
The results of the questionnaire, as depicted in figure 4 below, support this fact; when 
asked how often they have to source legacy and low volume parts, 60% of buyers said 
weekly, a further 20% said that it was on an annual basis and the final 20% was not 
specific in terms of occurrences per week, however did note that there was a 
requirement to cover legacy and low volume parts on a regular basis.  This demonstrates 
that for a majority of buyers, legacy and low volume parts are a large part of their day-
to-day job and supports what will be discussed in the literature review and also when 
analysing the interviews, that legacy and low volume parts are an important part of the 
business 
 
 
Figure 4: Analysis of the frequency with which buyers deal with legacy and low volume 
parts 
 
To illustrate the problems caused by this steady stream of legacy and low volume parts, 
analysis was done of the makeup of the critical parts tracked by the company1.  Figure 4 
shows an analysis of the critical parts lists; this was done by taking the full lists of critical 
parts from the Rolls-Royce intranet over a five week period, and then performing a pivot 
table analysis on each data set in order to split out the breakdown of parts versus engine 
project.  Once this was done, information from figure 2 was used to identify the engine 
projects considered as legacy, the assumption was made that all Marine projects are low 
volume.  The lists from the pivot table analysis were then split into two categories, 
legacy and low volume (using the criteria just stated) and ‘other’ which accounts for new 
engine build, development and high volume spares.  The respective percentages were 
worked out for each category, and these percentages were then plotted in a graph as per 
figure 5.   
                                                 
1 Critical parts are those that are tracked by a central department in the company 
because they are the most high profile, due to being late to their requirement date. 
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This analysis shows that for the 5 weeks of data analysed, legacy and low volume parts 
made up on average 50% of the critical parts being tracked by the company.  So around 
half of the parts in the company that are late to the requirement date and that are 
considered as the most critical to customers, are legacy and low volume components.   
This demonstrates that this is an important area for the company and one that merits 
further research. 
 
 
Figure 5: An Analysis of Critical Parts 
 
3.3 Perceptions of the Problems with Legacy and Low Volume Parts in Rolls-Royce 
The data above shows that there is a problem with legacy and low volume parts in terms 
of late delivery.  This part of the section will outline briefly what the headline problems 
are perceived to be with legacy and low volume components and supply chains in Rolls-
Royce.  The reason for summarising this here is that it provides a context for the 
literature review, there will be more in depth analysis on this in section 6. 
 
One of the questions discussed in the interviews was; “Do we have problems with legacy 
and low volume supply chains? And if so what are these problems?”  There was a 
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unanimous view that there are problems with legacy and low volume supply chains.  The 
view from the Marine sector was that problems with legacy and low volume supply chains 
are pronounced in this sector due to the nature and volume of the programmes, but that 
there are still issues elsewhere in the business.  However both Civil and Defence 
expressed the opinion that there are problems. 
 
It was noted that there is the perception that legacy and low volume parts in Rolls-
Royce, are generally given lower priority than production and New Product Introduction 
(NPI) parts.  As demonstrated in the prior discussion, legacy and low volume parts are 
often delivered late, and in the interviews it was stated that these parts are typically not 
given focus until they are on average six months late to the requirement.  One view was 
that, in terms of delivery performance, the performance on legacy parts is worse than on 
any other kind of part.  To illustrate the scope of the problem for Marine, the percentage 
of parts delivered on time to the required delivery date is around 20%.  If the horizon 
were to be extended to plus or minus three months of the required delivery date, the 
percentage would not rise significantly, and even at plus or minus twelve months the 
percentage delivered on time is around 60%.  This means that even after being a year 
late, some parts are still not delivered.  On top of this, there are 350 parts for which no 
source can be found (termed ‘un-sourceable’), all with firm customer demands. 
 
A common point noted was that aftermarket components are predominantly sourced on 
the same supply chains as production components both for in-house manufacture and in 
the external supply chain, which often leads to the need to make priority calls within the 
same supplier. 
 
3.4 The Importance of Legacy and Low Volume Parts to Rolls-Royce 
Interviewees were also asked, “How important are aftermarket legacy and low volume 
parts to the company?”  The view overall was that the focus accorded to legacy and low 
volume parts seems to be in stark contrast to the importance of these components.  
Often they are very profitable and given that they are mostly aftermarket, and 
aftermarket makes up a large proportion of revenues to the company (around 51%), 
they contribute to a large proportion of the company’s profits.  Low volume parts for new 
production can be important from a cash flow perspective, for example, in the Marine 
sector, due to the nature of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) contracts, Rolls-Royce 
receives stage payments upfront of the delivery of the engine.  Therefore, even before 
the engine is in service Rolls-Royce will have been paid for the majority of it, this is 
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different to the Civil business where engines are not paid for until received by the aircraft 
manufacturer. 
 
Another point made was that legacy and low volume parts are important from a 
reputation point of view.  For the Rolls-Royce brand it is important to be seen to be 
supporting the customer.  There is a high expectation of service thanks to the reputation 
of the brand, and this brand image needs to be upheld to protect future business.  It was 
also pointed out that if the company supports a legacy engine and it is perceived by the 
customer that they have received good customer service, this could help in securing new 
sales campaigns with that customer.  Conversely, if the experience was not positive, then 
future sales with a customer may be more difficult.  To illustrate this point, the 535c 
engine, which originally entered into service in 1983, is a good example of a legacy 
programme where the company is continuing to support.  DHL as a customer of the 
engine have stated that they want to run their 535c engines until 2024 and have asked 
Rolls-Royce to support the engines until then.  This is still seen as a profitable piece of 
business, and in addition, this could help to secure future business and also helps to 
maintain the Rolls-Royce brand reputation. 
 
In certain sectors of the business like for example Naval Marine and Aerospace Defence, 
there is a legal and moral obligation where the main customer is the UK MoD, to support 
the country’s armed forces.  From a corporate image perspective, the wrong message 
would be given if Rolls-Royce were to fail to support the country’s armed forces 
especially at a time when they are deployed in global conflicts.  
 
This section has underlined the fact that legacy and low volume components are 
important to Rolls-Royce and that there are thought to be problems with the current 
management of these parts.  The next section will review the literature on the subject of 
aftermarket supply chains and legacy and low volume supply chains to gain an insight 
into different view on the subject of legacy and low volume.  The aim of this is to 
understand if the problems faced by the company are common and if so, to find out how 
other companies have remedied these problems. 
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4. Literature Review 
 
This section will review literature on the subject of legacy and low volume supply chains, 
and that considered pertinent to legacy and low volume supply chains.  After researching 
specifically the topic of legacy and low volume supply chains, it is apparent that there is 
not a large body of literature on this subject.  In order to gain views and information 
from the literature, the search criteria had to be widened to include articles related to 
aftermarket supply chains and supply chain design in general.  This approach was 
deemed to be appropriate, as some articles that focus on the general topic of 
aftermarket supply chains do discuss to a certain extent the issues and challenges 
related to legacy and low volume.  In addition, as discussed in section 1, legacy 
components are a sub set of the aftermarket and low volume components in Rolls-Royce 
with the exception of Marine and Nuclear are for the aftermarket.  Supply chain design, 
as a research area is broad and so the scope for this literature review will be research on 
aftermarket supply chain design and supply chains design frameworks. 
 
This literature review is broken down into three sections; firstly, the importance of 
aftermarket legacy and low volume supply chains, as perceived by the literature will be 
briefly discussed.  Following this, difficulties with aftermarket, legacy and low volume 
supply chains will be reviewed.  Thirdly, views on supply chain design will be discussed.  
The focus in all of these sections will be on finding information that is most pertinent to 
legacy and low volume supply chains, and in some cases within this section, aftermarket 
is used as a proxy for legacy and low volume.  The aim of this literature review is to 
respond to the third stated objective in section 1.2. 
 
4.1 The Importance of Aftermarket / Legacy and Low Volume Components  
4.1.1 Financial Importance 
The first theme to come from the literature is that of the financial importance of the 
aftermarket (and hence legacy and low volume components).  Which is consistent with 
the views expressed in the interviews are discussed in the previous section.  Farris et al 
(2005) recognise that the revenues from aftermarket can be significant (and in excess of 
the value of the original sale). This view is in line with that of Rhodes et al (2006), who 
state; “the aftermarket has long been an important source of revenue for OEMs (Original 
Equipment Manufacturers) such as manufacturers of civil aircraft engines and cars”.  
That is to say that it is a profitable source of business and can account for a large 
proportion of a firm’s revenues.   
 20 
4.1.2 Customer Service 
Another view highlighted in the interview responses was the fact that good customer 
service on these legacy and low volume products can support new sales; this is 
consistent with the views in the literature.  Cohen et al (2006) discuss how services have 
become an important selling point for companies.  In addition, something that Cohen et 
al (2006) noted in addition to this, that was not discussed explicitly in the Rolls-Royce 
interviews is that businesses have realised that there are many opportunities in the 
aftermarket, for example, spare parts, repairs, upgrades, re-conditioning, inspection, 
technical support, maintenance, training and finance, thus highlighting the point made 
above that potential opportunities for profit exist from multiple sources.  
 
Jones (2001) states that aftermarket support is a great contributor to overall customer 
satisfaction, particularly in industries like Aerospace.  Cristello (2009) talks about the 
automotive industry and observes that customer are now keeping vehicles for longer due 
to the economic downturn, meaning an increased demand for aftermarket components.  
This means a potentially increased demand for legacy and low volume components as 
older models are kept in service for longer.  The idea of supporting the customer was 
also picked up in the interviews conducted in Roll-Royce.  The fact that customers may 
be keeping products in service for longer however was not mentioned. 
 
4.1.3 Strategic Importance 
A third theme to come from the literature that was also picked up in the interviews in 
Rolls-Royce, is the idea of the strategic importance to the business of the aftermarket. 
Cohen et al (2006) argue that good after sales support impacts customer satisfaction, 
which has an effect on a company’s share price.  They give a variety of reasons as to 
why the aftermarket is strategically important to businesses, these reasons are 
summarised in table 1 below and all can be argued as being applicable to legacy and low 
volume components.  Rossetti & Choi, (2008) claim that studies have shown that 70% of 
share price of companies in engineering and manufacturing is down to aftermarket 
performance.  Therefore companies should pay close attention to this part of their 
business and be aware of any threats from potential competition from their suppliers. 
 
It appears that the key themes from the literature on the importance of aftermarket and 
legacy and low volume parts in terms of financial and strategic importance, and criticality 
to customer satisfaction, are those views shared by those interviewed in Roll-Royce 
which does indicate that the importance of this as a subject is understood.  For Rolls-
Royce, given that for aftermarket, the legacy and low volume components make up a 
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large proportion of the aftermarket requirements and they make up a large proportion of 
the problem components in the company as discussed in section 3, it is clear that this 
topic should be a focus for managers. 
 
Revenue A lower risk revenue stream 
Cheaper to sell to than to find new 
customers 
Can be sold upgrades or new models if 
good after market service is given 
Existing customers 
Build a relationship and gather data which 
makes it more difficult for the customer to 
switch to another company 
Differentiator A company can use the quality of its after 
sales service as a differentiator 
Table 1: The Importance of the Aftermarket  
(Generated using information taken from Cohen et al (2006) P130) 
 
4.2 Difficulties With Aftermarket (Legacy) and Low Volume Supply Chains 
4.2.1 Forecasting and Planning 
The first common theme noted throughout the literature is that of forecasting.  This was 
picked up as an issue in the interviews conducted for this study as will be discussed in 
section 6.  According to Cohen et al (2006), and Rhodes et al (2006), one of the 
problems for businesses is that the aftermarket demand signal is not regular or 
predictable therefore planning is difficult and this is clearly pertinent to legacy and low 
volume.  Jones (2001) supports this view and notes that unforeseen events can cause a 
demand for a spare part and this makes this part of the business very difficult to predict.  
For legacy engines forecasting which of the fleet of older products will require a certain 
component is very difficult especially when as Rhodes et al (2006) observe, support for a 
product can be required for years and even decades in some industries like aerospace.  
Cohen et al (2006) state that forecasting is often not as accurate as it could be, because 
companies often use the same planning tools for legacy and low volume parts as those 
used for production parts which they state will not necessarily yield the right results.  
This is because the parameters for the markets are different and so a different approach 
is needed.  Jones (2001) shares the view of Cohen et al (2006) and suggests that that 
predicting spares demand requires a different approach to that used for initial 
production.  
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4.2.2 Inventory and Obsolete Parts 
A consequence of difficulties with forecasting can be inventory build, which is another 
common theme in many of the articles in the literature and something that was also 
mentioned in the interviews. Farris et al (2005) talks about ‘obsolete parts’ and the fact 
that these cause a lot of problems for companies in aerospace due to the pace at which 
technology develops meaning that parts become obsolete quickly.  They note that many 
companies have to either buy all of the remaining stock of a part and hold it in case of a 
demand or that they sell these parts to a distributor for them to sell when a demand 
appears.  They also highlight the fact that often these issues are dealt with last minute.  
In some cases parts have to be reverse engineering to understand how to make more of 
them which can be very expensive.  “Decisions on future needs for parts must therefore 
be made early in the product's life.” This idea of having a clearer strategy at the 
beginning of a products life was also commented on in the interviews. 
 
4.2.3 Common Supply Chains, Priority Issues and Conflicting Objectives 
Another common theme is that of the difficulty of having aftermarket, legacy and low 
volume components sourced in the same supply chains as production components.  Slack 
et al (2001) comment that often components for both the new and running production 
market and aftermarket are most likely made in the same operation and that “unless this 
is carefully managed, or the operation split between the two chains, this can lead to 
conflicting objectives”. Rhodes et al (2006) suggest that common mistakes made by 
businesses include; not coordinating production and aftermarket supply chains, not 
managing the transition of a product from original sales to aftermarket only, and, not 
understanding the ”dynamics of aftermarket supply”.  Rhodes et al (2006) state that 
managing a legacy and low volume supply chain is difficult when it has to fit with the 
production supply chain.   
 
This issue with legacy and low volume components being sourced in the production 
supply chains was expressed in the interviews conducted.  Also commented on was a 
lack of priority for legacy and low volume which is supported by Rhodes et al (2006) who 
believe that, aftermarket supply chains in general tend to be an ‘afterthought’.  This 
often means, according to the authors, that they are not well integrated with the main 
production supply chains and do not take advantage of any of the advances or 
efficiencies gained in the production supply chains.  They suggest that managers are not 
cognisant of the impact that a lack of focus on the aftermarket can have on their 
business. 
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This idea of companies not understanding the aftermarket and the differences inherent in 
aftermarket supply chain was a common one throughout the literature.  McConnell 
(2007) states that; "OEMs rarely have interest in solving problems in legacy programs."  
Cohen et al (2006) talk about the fact that within an organisation, departments can have 
conflicting objectives for example the services side of the business can have objectives 
that conflict with the production part of the business.  Companies should try to avoid 
these conflicts where they are detrimental to the business overall by aligning objectives.  
They suggest that companies should have an independent department that can make 
decisions on priorities where the need arises.  The lack of understanding and the 
conflicting objectives were not issues expressed in the interviews conducted which could 
indicate that a lack of understanding is not an issue in Roll-Royce. 
 
4.2.4 Use of Third Parties 
Because of the difficulties outlined above, along with other factors, Cohen et al (2006) 
note that many businesses struggle with how to support the aftermarket, legacy and low 
volume supply components, and especially with how to support these in an efficient way. 
It is noted that because of this, in the automobile industry for example, many companies 
are happy to let third parties produce and sell their spare parts.  This idea of letting third 
parties manage the aftermarket on behalf of the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
will be discussed further in the next section of this report. 
 
4.2.5 Supplier Relationships and Sourcing Practices 
The difficulties of managing the aftermarket supply chains and managing the 
relationships with suppliers was another theme identified in the literature and one that 
was not highlighted in the interviews or the questionnaires. Conflicting objectives were 
discussed before, however this was within the company; objectives can also conflict 
between the company and the suppliers and can be a cause for difficulties in a 
relationship.  Rossetti and Choi (2008) point out that if there is an element of goal 
incongruence between suppliers and the OEM, this could be a reason for 
underperformance in delivery.  For example, due to a poor relationship caused by this 
incongruence, suppliers may not focus their efforts on meeting contracted delivery dates.  
This could suggest that companies should be looking at contracts for aftermarket parts 
and considering them differently to production parts.  
 
Sourcing can raise issues, as Rossetti & Choi (2005) discuss; they state that there can be 
problems associated with the way strategic sourcing has been applied in the aerospace 
industry.  They note that due to the fact that OEMs sell products at or close to cost, they 
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rely on the aftermarket for revenues to cover the costs of developing the product in the 
first place.   This led OEMs to control the relationship with the end user and ensure that 
suppliers could not contact or sell to the end user themselves without going through the 
OEM. Rossetti and Choi (2005) also highlight that ‘strategic sourcing practices’ in the 
aerospace industry have caused poor relationships between suppliers and OEMs and this 
combined with the increase pressure from the end user for cost reductions has caused 
many suppliers to enter the aftermarket.  (Appendix 9 has further detail on strategic 
sourcing and what this means). 
 
4.2.6 Supply Chain Disintermediation and PMA (Parts Manufacturer Approval) Parts 
There is another big issue identified in the literature, linked to management of suppliers, 
is what Rossetti & Choi, (2008) term “Supply Chain Disintermediation” (SCD).  They 
explain that this occurs if a supplier starts to sell direct to the customer rather than 
through the OEM for aftermarket components.  This can mean that OEMs lose out on a 
proportion of the revenues that they may have already forecast in their budgets. Rossetti 
and Choi (2008) explain that during the 1990s many suppliers started to sell direct to the 
end customer. The authors state that 56% of suppliers in the industry have entered the 
aftermarket to an extent.   
 
The authors suggest that the goal of protecting the aftermarket is not often explicit on 
OEMs actions or strategies.  They do cite cases though where large OEMs have taken 
legal action to prevent a supplier from entering the aftermarket. However legal action 
can only be taken when the problems is known about, as Rossetti & Choi, (2008) 
observe, many suppliers are now selling directly to the end user without any agreement 
from the OEM, and often breaching contracts to do so. Indeed they note that; 
“Approximately 70 percent of engine PMA parts are manufactured without an OEM license 
agreement”.  This could become more of a problem with the move towards sourcing 
more in the Asia pacific region where in some countries for example China, it is widely 
reported in the media that the respect of intellectual property is not as strictly enforced 
as in the Western world. 
 
Along similar lines is something highlighted by McConnell (2007), who talks about PMA 
parts; PMA means Parts Manufacturer Approval, and this refers to legislation in the USA 
regarding authorisation for manufacturers to produce parts for aircraft for which they are 
not the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer).  This means that if they have approval 
suppliers can produce their own versions of components.  This is much more common in 
the automotive industry, and perhaps this should be taken as an indication of what could 
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happen in the aerospace industry in time, given that as an industry aerospace usually 
lags behind automotive.  
 
There are clearly well documented issues facing the management of aftermarket part and 
legacy and low volume parts, many of which are understood already by Rolls-Royce as 
evidenced by the results of the questionnaires.  
 
4.3 Supply Chain Design 
Now that the importance of legacy and low volume parts and the key issues faced by 
companies in managing these parts are understood, it is important to look for potential 
solutions to these problems.  The idea that aftermarket supply chains (especially for 
legacy and low volume components) should be treated differently to production and high 
volume supply chains has been discussed briefly above, and this concept will be explored 
further now with reference to suggested frameworks both specific to aftermarket and 
general.  As noted at the very start of this section, the literature on legacy and low 
volume supply chains is not extensive and as such there is no one suggested framework 
or ideal solution for managing legacy and low volume parts. 
 
“Rhodes et al (2006) suggest that; “In effect, aftermarket supply has to be sustained as 
a separate venture, particularly once sale of a main product has been discontinued and 
the associated production chain has been closed down.”  
 
4.3.1 Different Competitive Drivers for Different Supply Chains 
The drivers for the different types of supply chains can be very different.  Slack et al 
(2001) note the differences in the demands of both aftermarket and new production 
markets.  They use the example of the automotive industry where a manufacturer of a 
component can have two distinct customers, firstly the car manufacturers requiring 
components for new production vehicles, and secondly, the spares market, which could 
be spares distributors or garages.  They note that for new production the competitive 
drivers are price, volume and quality.  For the aftermarket the drivers are for a wide 
variety of components at lower volumes that support wide ranges of vehicles, tied with 
quick response times and technical support.  In effect as Slack et al (2001) note, they 
have “two quite different supply chains which value different competitive factors”.  Given 
that companies can serve different types of markets, Slack et al (2001) propose that 
companies should have ‘different supply chain policies’ for different markets.  This 
example is very pertinent to the management of legacy and low volume parts and it is 
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interesting to note that this idea of different drivers for the different supply chains was 
only briefly mentioned in the interviews conducted. 
 
4.3.2 Matching Characteristics of Components and Supply Chains 
Matching characteristics of components and supply chains is discussed by Fisher (1997).  
He believes that companies should examine the characteristics of their products, and the 
characteristics of their supply chains, and attempt to match them.  He argues that 
mismatches in these two elements are the cause of many problems in companies supply 
chains.  As can be seen from figure 6, Fisher talks about functional and innovative 
products and efficient and responsive supply chains.  While this is a simplistic way to 
view supply chains and their design, the key salient point from this article is that while 
there could be other dimensions on which to judge products or supply strategies than 
those suggested by Fisher, the main point is clear that it is important to consider that the 
characteristics of legacy and low volume supply chains could be different to those of the 
new product introduction supply chain or a running production supply chain, and hence a 
different strategy may be needed to cope with these different requirements.  
 
 
Figure 6: “Matching Supply Chains with Products” (Fisher, 1997) 
 
4.3.3 Service and Manufacturing Supply Chains Compared 
Cohen et al (2006) state that “Services supply chains and manufacturing supply chains 
both consist of entities and assets linked by the flow of materials, information, and 
money, but they differ in many ways”.  They argue that managers need to notice and 
understand these differences and plan and enact the supply chains accordingly.  They 
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illustrate the differences, which can be seen in figure 7.  Clearly the authors see 
aftermarket and production supply chains as having distinctly different characteristics.  
For example, they note that demand is less predictable for aftermarket, they also note 
that response rates need to be quicker for aftermarket, that the number of different part 
numbers can be more vast and that there needs to be a supply chain able to cope with 
the variety and response rates.  This is in stark contrast to the properties of a production 
supply chain.  This is clearly relevant for legacy and low volume supply chains. 
 
 
Figure 7: Aftermarket and manufacturing supply chains compared  
(Taken from Cohen et al (2006) p132.) 
 
As can be seen from Appendix 5, Cohen et al (2006) have proposed a framework for the 
aftermarket.  They argue that this is a proven approach.  A key point from their 
explanation of the process is step one, which states that a company should decide on 
which products it plans to support in the aftermarket.  They use the example of Kodak, 
which supports digital cameras but not disposable ones in the aftermarket.  This point of 
deciding what to support is an interesting one, as was discussed in section 3, often Rolls-
Royce cannot choose whether to support a customer when the customer in question is 
the country’s government.  However, in other industries, like with the example of Kodak, 
the question is asked as to what will be supported in the aftermarket.  Having a 
framework against which to make this decision could be a useful tool. The consumer 
electronics industry is another where product lifecycles move a lot faster and where new 
models are constantly brought out meaning that often consumers buy new rather than 
repairing meaning that in this industry, support for older models is not provided.  
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4.3.4 Demand and Supply Uncertainty 
There are other strategies; as laid out by Lee (2002), who stated that supply chain 
management strategies could be based on supply and demand uncertainty and he argues 
that; “Supply chain strategies that are based on a one-size-fits-all or a try-every-thing 
mentality will fail.”  His framework plots supply and demand uncertainty to give four 
different supply chins strategies corresponding to the different combinations of the two 
factors as can be seen in figure 8.  Lee (2002) suggests that organizations should employ 
responsive supply chain strategies when supply uncertainty is low and demand 
uncertainty is high.  He defines being responsive as being “flexible to the changing and 
diverse needs of the customers”. Responsiveness is not the only word used in the 
literature when talking about responding quickly to customers, agility is a word often 
used.  Christopher and Towill (2000) when discussing agile supply chains talk about 
supply chains being able to “read and respond to real demand’. Gunasekarana et al 
(2008), define responsive supply chains as those that are able to “React quickly and cost 
effectively to changing market requirements”. The idea of supply chains needing to be 
more agile for legacy and low volume parts was picked up in the interviews. 
Figure 8: Hau Lee’s uncertainty framework (Lee, 2002) 
 
4.3.5 Using a Third Party 
Aside from the above discussion on the fact that aftermarket supply chains have different 
characteristics to production supply chains, and should thus be designed differently.  
There is the question of whether or not supporting legacy and low volume components is 
something that is in the best interests of the OEM or whether someone else could do the 
job more efficiently. Cohen et al (2006) discuss the fact that some companies choose to 
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have a 3pl deliver their aftermarket services if they feel that that is the most efficient 
solution.  However they argue that companies should focus on the long term and the 
potential of a long running revenue stream from the aftermarket.   
 
4.3.6 Use of Alliances 
Farris et al (2005) also note the use of joint ventures and alliances in the aftermarket 
sector, they talk about the fact that Rolls-Royce has alliances with major airlines to form 
repair bases around the world located at the base of these customers.  Caterpillar 
Logistics services supports Honeywell on aftermarket ‘parts support’  “With the 
Caterpillar alliance, Honeywell will have a more efficient system in place to get a larger 
volume of aftermarket products to customers when they want them”.  The authors note 
the increased use of web portals to facilitate sales of parts.  They use the example of the 
Exostar portal, which is used widely in the aerospace industry.  “Some distributors are 
authorized by component manufacturers to sell obsolete parts. In this "ship direct" 
model, the OEM receives a percentage of the business generated and conducts the 
marketing function by guiding customers to the authorized dealer”.  The use of third 
parties was discussed in the interviews conducted and as will be discuss in section 5 
Rolls-Royce does use third parties to a limited extent as will be discussed in section 6.  
There will be further discussions about the use of third parties in the next section of this 
report. 
 
4.3.7 Aligning Goals With Suppliers 
Supplier selection was an issue discussed in the previous section on problems with legacy 
and low volume supply chains.  This is an important aspect to consider and Rossetti and 
Choi (2008) discuss various points relating to selecting suppliers in the aftermarket 
supply chain.  Often suppliers could try to bypass the OEM and sell direct to the end 
customer, as previously stated.   In order to reduce the likelihood of this and in order to 
keep a hold of the aftermarket revenues, OEMs need to ensure that contracts are aligned 
to supplier goals as well as their own, both operationally and financially, they should also 
review the usual purchasing policy in large aerospace OEMs of pressuring for price 
reductions every year.   This brings up an important point which is that as the product 
moves through its lifecycle and the nature of demand changes, OEMs should be aware of 
the changes in suppliers goals relative to the components they source from them.  
According to McConnell (2007), OEMs are using the total care type agreements to lock in 
their customers and avoid them using PMA parts.  This is something Rolls-Royce also do 
for the new and high volume engine programmes however this is not always feasible for 
the older engines as the operators running these engines may not find that they can 
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afford to pay a monthly fee for support and they may need to find the cheapest way to 
maintain their engines which may be to buy PMA parts, this is something Rolls-Royce 
should be aware of. 
 
4.3.8 A Separate Procurement Department for Legacy and Low Volume Parts 
Farris et al (2005) discuss the fact that, in the US defence sector, the Pentagon have 
created a department called Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC) now called the 
Defense Supply Center who’s job it is to search out supplies of components that are 
required for the aftermarket but for which production has been discontinued.  They note 
that “Military systems may be in use for decades, and therefore sourcing replacements is 
of concern.”  This idea of having a dedicated team sourcing legacy components is an 
important point to consider, this suggests that this is done separately to the sourcing of 
new components for development and aftermarket.  This was discussed briefly in the 
interviews and will be further explored later in the report when the PPES department is 
discussed.  The purchasing questionnaire did pick up some elements discussed above in 
terms of how suppliers may be pressured into taking on legacy parts as part of an overall 
package, which may cause resentment.  The purchasing practices are potentially 
something that should be reviewed for legacy and low volume components and this point 
will be re-visited later in the report. 
 
4.3.9 The Service Lifecycle Maturity (SLM) model 
Further considerations for designing aftermarket legacy and low volume supply chains 
are captured in a model developed by McClusky (2004), the Service Lifecycle Maturity 
(SLM) model.  The graph in figure 9 indicates the different stages that a company should 
review and follow when looking to develop their service business and further detail is 
given in appendix 6.  The author suggests that only by reviewing the current level of 
maturity of its service business, can a company hope to improve in the future.  A 
company could use this model to map where they think their service operation fits in 
terms of level of maturity and then they can use this as a start point to understand the 
next steps to get them to the next level of maturity.  This could be a good approach for 
Rolls-Royce in that they could review the current level of maturity in legacy and low 
volume supply chains separately to the other types of supply chains. 
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Figure 9: The SLM Maturity Model (McClusky, 2004) 
 
“Baseline Service” is the first level of maturity and this is described as being the basic 
level where companies focus on meeting response times to customer orders and basically 
to satisfying requirements in a timely manner.  The second level is “Operational 
Efficiency”, this is a decision point, if companies want to focus generating future 
revenues from service they move to stage 3, if they merely want to focus on managing 
the costs of services and minimising this they stay at this level.  From level 3 to level 4 
companies focus their efforts on making their service operation more and more efficient 
and able to generate further sales and revenues. 
 
4.3.10 Use of Information Technology (IT) 
Information technology is an important aspect to consider, this is not something that was 
mentioned in any of the interviews.  Hill (2006) gives some case examples where 
companies have upgraded their IT systems to be able to cope with their aftermarket 
supply chains.  Universal Instruments for example had separate system in each of its 
regions, which meant that it was difficult to have a consolidated view of the total stock of 
components in the company as a whole.   By implementing a global system they could 
view all inventory across the company and if one location had run out, they could search 
for the nearest location with stock.  This potentially suggests that an important part of 
managing the aftermarket supply chain is having a clear view of your total stock position 
in the various locations and repair bases.  Pooling and allowing different locations to 
support shortages at other locations can help reduce total company inventory and reduce 
instances of not being able to satisfy customer requirements. 
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Hill (2006) suggests that by consolidating this picture of inventory and usage across the 
different sites, predicting and forecasting can be better facilitated as the historical data 
can be used as indicative.  Although it is worth questioning whether or not it is 
necessarily the case that past data is indicative of future demand in the aftermarket. 
Cohen et al (2006) also discuss the fact that the location of inventory is an important 
consideration.  They state that as an improvement for most companies, the location of 
spare parts is important to get right and in some cases companies could look at pooling 
inventory to reduce costs. McConnell (2007) also notes that consignment stock of spares 
is becoming more popular, also pooling of these parts.  Reduces cost to the aircraft 
operator of holding the inventory as they only pay for a part when it’s used.  
 
Another case company used by Hill (2006) is InFocus, manufacturers of digital projection 
systems.  They implemented a system that helped them to determine where parts in 
stock could be used as substitutes for parts that customers required that were out of 
stock.  They also made sure that the system could support decision making as to the 
best option for obtaining an out of stock components required by a customer be that 
“pulling them from another InFocus location, repairing existing parts, building new ones, 
or purchasing them from an outside vendor”.  With the new tools this company found 
that they were able to reduce inventory and improve customer service. These issues 
were not picked up in the interviews but are important and should be considered by 
Rolls-Royce for legacy and low volume components. 
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5. Case Studies 
 
The literature review in the previous section sought to gain some general views on 
aftermarket supply chains that could be related to legacy and low volume supply chains.  
Following the review of the literature and the identification of the idea that a different 
approach should be taken for legacy and low volume supply chains, further investigation 
was done to try to find examples of companies taking a different approach with their 
aftermarket, legacy and low volume components.  Due to the lack of literature on this 
subject there are no case examples proposing an ideal solution, however the brief cases 
discussed below cover certain elements that may be of use when developing a framework 
for Rolls-Royce.  This section will contribute to objective 3 as stated in section 1.2 in 
addition to the literature review.    
5.1 Royal Navy Warship Spares: Inventory Holding Throughout the Supply Chains 
Fowler (2001) in a case about spares provisioning for the Royal Navy Warships talks 
about the idea of applying Just-In-Time (JIT) methods to spares provisioning. This case 
illustrates a solution that involves holding inventory to cover potential future demands.  
The components in this case are described as being those that have “higher set-up costs 
for small batch production” and where “development costs are high relative to material 
costs”.  This effectively means these are low volume and legacy type parts.  The difficulty 
with these kinds of supply chains is that as Fowler (2001) notes, rapid response rates to 
demands are required and often at short notice because forecasting can be difficult.  
While short notice may be required, lead times are often long.  Fowler (2001) states 
that; “The implication is that this can only be achieved through holding finished goods 
inventory.”  
 
He notes that the traditional model involved the Royal Navy holding stock both on board 
vessels and at bases on shore to ensure coverage of critical spares.  The suggested 
change to this model was to require the OEM suppliers of the components to hold stock 
of both finished and part finished components dependant on the lead-time of each 
individual component and it constituent parts and raw materials.  This effectively makes 
this a vendor managed inventory (VMI) solution. 
 
Fowler (2001) notes that this is in an attempt to share the risk across the total supply 
chain rather than solely on the Royal Navy.  In addition to requiring suppliers to hold 
stocks, another suggestion is to put responsibility solely on the supplier to make the 
decision as to whether to repair or replace components that are returned to it from a 
vessel.  This is instead of this being a decision that involved all parties and much 
negotiation about the cost of repair versus the cost of new which has been the traditional 
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approach.  The implication of this kind of set up would clearly mean that the supplier 
would expect some compensation in the form of a management fee, which would have to 
be agreed with the customer.  The suggestion in the case is that the price for the 
components and the lead-time for provision would be set and that would be the expected 
service levels for all components of that type supplied. This gives the end customer, in 
this case the Royal Navy, more certainty in how it can plan its spares, as it can rely on 
contracted lead times and response rates along with the assurance that stock is being 
held in the supply chain.     
 
“Achieving a trade-off between inventory cost and availability is a difficult problem to 
solve”(Fowler 2001).  This could be argued to be a fair statement, however the approach 
suggested by the author may not be applicable in all cases.  It has to be noted that while 
having inventory held throughout the supply chain and having guaranteed lead times 
from the suppliers will help the end customer in their planning activity, the problem of 
how to plan and forecast and how to manage inventory levels properly is passed down to 
the supply chains meaning that the problem does not in effect go away, it is passed on to 
someone else to deal with.   If this approach were to be taken, then it would be very 
important to align the goals of the customer and the supplier to make sure that the 
outcome is favourable for both in order to avoid any future problems as discussed in the 
literature review. 
 
5.2 Licensing Agreements on Legacy Components: Ontic 
Flint (2004) discuses Goodrich, and the fact that their strategy is to “own the rights to 
the aftermarket.”  He notes that the company sees the aftermarket as a reason for 
entering into a market in the first place and that around one third of the company’s sales 
are accounted for by the aftermarket.  In researching this further, it appears that one 
solution thy use in order to support their legacy products, is to have components 
manufactured under licence by another company (Business Wire, 2007).  Ontic is a 
company that according to their website; “supports original equipment manufacturers by 
taking complete responsibility for legacy or sunset products — under license or 
acquisition — allowing the OEM to focus on their current and future programs.” (Ontic, 
2011a).  According a press article, Ontic produce landing gear systems under licence 
from Goodrich for legacy products (Business Wire, 2007). 
 
Further research into Ontic as a company using their website reveals that Ontic is a 
company that focuses purely on manufacturing components under licence for OEM 
manufacturers, they state explicitly on their website that they do not design new 
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products or similar products to rival those made for their OEM customers (Ontic, 2011b).  
In this way they are securing the trust of the OEMs and this allows the OEMs to mitigate 
the threat discussed before of their suppliers entering the aftermarket as a direct 
competitor.  Ontic counts among its customers, in addition to Goodrich, many large 
companies in the aerospace industry, including GE, Hamilton Sunstrand, Parker, and 
Eaton to name a few (Ontic, 2011c). 
 
Ontic claims that it will take over the management of the legacy products licensed to it, it 
takes on the supply chains, manufacturing, all tooling and technical information and in 
return the OEM will receive royalties from sales without having to use resource managing 
these products themselves.  This is an interesting case and one that could be of use to 
Rolls-Royce, given that many of the companies it woks with are listed as customer of 
Ontic, this could possibly be something to consider as part of a different approach to 
managing legacy and low volume parts. 
 
5.3 Inventory Pooling: Saturn 
Saturn is a brand owned by GM, it is now being phased out for new production of cars, 
but continues to support the aftermarket (Saturn, 2009).  Cohen et al (2000) studied the 
Saturn approach to supplying spare parts, as it was consistently the best at meeting 
customer requirements.  The key findings from this which are useful to consider are that 
the concept of jointly managed inventory was used, Saturn took a lot of the responsibility 
from the dealers in its repair network for forecasting and suggesting inventory levels.  
Further, it pooled inventory between dealers thus eliminating the competition between 
dealers, as Saturn would bear the cost for any transfer between dealers.  This idea of 
inventory pooling could be something that could be useful to consider for the aerospace 
inventory.  While the set up of dealerships is not common to the aerospace industry, a 
different approach could be taken to this and perhaps jointly owned inventory could be 
discussed as an option with customers for legacy and low volume components. 
 
Another important general point from the articles is the idea of “Aligning supply chain 
strategy with criticality”, that is, understanding the criticality of a component in question 
to the customer and its operation and setting up the supply chain so that it can support 
accordingly.   Having a different approach for different customer groups can yield 
benefits.  The amount that customers are willing to pay and the amount of time they are 
willing to wait will differ by customer type, and this again could be a useful consideration 
for legacy and low volume components where the customer base will differ and may have 
different expectations. 
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5.4 Sourcing Specific Suppliers for Legacy: Ford 
As discussed in the literature review, the approach taken for sourcing of suppliers for 
aftermarket or legacy and low volume components is important to consider.  Webb 
(2005) discusses the case of Ford who have been working on their aftermarket sourcing 
strategy and have established “an aftermarket parts sourcing office in Shanghai”.  The 
article recognises that “sourcing aftermarket parts is different from sourcing parts for 
production”, this is due to lower volumes and hence greater need for quicker tooling 
changeovers.  This idea of treating aftermarket (low volume and legacy) and production 
supply chains differently was discussed above in the literature review and it is something 
that any company dealing with both kinds of components should consider. 
 
Webb (2005) explains that Ford is looking for lower cost sources to produce aftermarket 
parts.  The author notes that there is a rigorous selection process for suppliers and they 
have to prove technical capability.   
 
Further research into this on the Ford website shows that Ford has launched a brand of 
spare parts branded ‘Motorcraft’.  On reviewing the website for Motorcraft (Ford, 2011a), 
it appears that Ford has two channels for selling aftermarket components, it advertises 
“Ford Motor Company Genuine Parts”, described as “original equipment parts for Ford, 
Lincoln and Mercury vehicles”.  And “Motorcraft parts” which are described as “High-
quality, vehicle-specific replacement parts recommended by Ford Motor Company.”  The 
website allows the user to search for spare parts and options are given including parts 
from both brands.  For some components, there are only options from one of the brands 
however for some, there are options from both brands with Motorcraft being the cheaper 
of the two.   
 
As can be seen from figure 10 below, the Motorcraft part is the cheaper component.  
Ford’s low cost sourcing strategy allows them to offer these alternatives at a lower price.  
This may or may not be feasible for companies like Rolls-Royce in the aerospace industry 
where the cost effectiveness of having two brands of the same components may not be 
financially advantageous.  However, what is important to note is the idea of finding 
alternative supply chains for lower volume components and this is in line with the 
thinking in the literature that the supply chain should be treated differently and may be 
something that Rolls-Royce could consider. 
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Figure 10: Ford Motorcraft Components 
Taken from the Ford parts website (Ford, 2011b) 
 
5.5 An Alternative Product Line for Legacy Components (Caterpillar) 
Caterpillar is a manufacturer of large industrial products like Rolls-Royce.  It has 
developed an alternative line of products called ‘CatClassic’ for its legacy products, “Cat 
Classic Parts are a competitively-priced repair alternative for older Cat equipment” 
(Caterpillar, 2011).  This appears to be similar to the approach of Ford as discussed 
above.  It appears that a lower priced alternative to the original Caterpillar parts are still 
made to the same specification, but by a supplier network.  The justification for having 
this alternative solution is the recognition that customers may be looking for a more cost 
effective repair solution if they are operating older machines (Finning, 2011).   
 
After researching these further, it appears that these parts are sold through the dealer 
network, one dealer notes that the advantage of the Cat Classic parts is that they are 
genuine parts for a lower price and the fact that they are genuine means that they cut 
out the risk of buying non genuine parts (Westrac, 2011).  This links back to the 
discussion in the literature review about PMA parts and the risk to OEMs of these lower 
priced alternative parts on offer, it appears that the strategy from Caterpillar to protect 
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their market for legacy components is to have this lower priced alternative.  As noted in 
the literature review, the risks around PMA parts were not picked up in any of the 
interviews and perhaps this indicates that this is not being considered enough by Rolls-
Royce. 
 
The idea of having a lower priced option may not be feasible as discussed and there are 
different considerations around aerospace as opposed to large excavators.  Regulations 
around the quality of parts are justifiably more stringent for aerospace, and it may not be 
feasible to reduce the quality to reduce the price without impacting safety, which is the 
paramount concern for aerospace.  However if this was investigated fully, this is a 
different approach that may be worth considering especially if combined with a licensing 
deal similar to that discussed previously between Goodrich and Ontic.  This could be a 
more cost effective may of continuing to support legacy products for longer more 
effectively. 
 
5.6 Information Systems: Toyota 
Information systems are especially important when managing inventory is a key 
contributor to successfully meeting customer requirements.  For legacy and low volume 
supply chains, having an understanding of what inventory is in which locations for each 
component is critical as this could mitigate the requirement to find a source to 
manufacture a small batch of a component if a viable item was found to be in inventory.  
Pryweller (2001) talks about Toyota and the fact that they had problems with parts being 
delivered late to requirements in the aftermarket.  They also had the problem of excess 
inventory leading to obsolete stock and consequently slow stock turns.  In order to fix 
this they implemented a new IT system to facilitate sharing of information between 
Toyota, dealers and suppliers, it will consolidate forecasts to give a clear view to 
suppliers, and in addition, suppliers can load in their delivery dates which are clearly 
visible in the system.  This kind of approach may not be as feasible for Rolls-Royce but 
certainly the idea of having a better view of what stock is available in order to mitigate 
the need to source small batches on the supply chain is something that should be 
considered as part of any framework for managing legacy and low volume parts. 
 
5.7 Core Competence: Sun Microsystems & DHL 
The idea that supplying legacy and low volume components may not be a company’s 
core competence was introduced above in the literature review.  Field (2005) explains 
that Sun Microsystems (now part of Oracle) has made the decision to use DHL as a single 
source service provider to manage all of the company’s aftermarket requirements.   They 
 39 
moved to one supplier because previously they had multiple suppliers across the different 
regions of the world, which made consolidation of data and an understanding of the full 
stock picture difficult.  Field (2005) also notes that Sun identifies it core competencies as 
being “research, development and manufacturing” therefore supporting the aftermarket 
does not fit in as a core competence and hence the decision to outsource.  Suns aim 
according to Field (2005), is to get to a position where they proactively anticipate 
customer requirements rather than simply react to requests.  Sun has tight agreements 
with its customers for service levels and response times, sometimes measured in hours, 
therefore it needs to be efficient in the way it handles its aftermarket business.  The idea 
of using third parties will be discussed again in the next section, and the idea of having 
one provider is interesting, as it will be noted that Rolls-Royce currently uses multiple 
companies in different parts of the business.    
 
5.8 Specialist Companies: Electronics - Oxygen Corp 
Some companies make their money as specialists in sourcing obsolete components.  For 
example, Silverman (2000) talks about Oxygen Corp, which operates in the electronics 
industry buying and selling obsolete components.   They claims that: “Obsolete 
components may account for only 2% of the total electronic components market, but 
they can require up to 20% of a purchasing department's resources.” 
 
This understanding that a lot of purchasing effort can be taken up researching stock 
locations is something experienced by Rolls-Royce.  The example of Oxygen suggests 
that in some cases it may be worth seeking out companies who specialise in sourcing of 
legacy components to assist on setting up supply chains for these components.  
 
5.9 A Different Approach to Forecasting for Legacy and Low Volume Parts 
Wheatley (2008) discusses the problems often associated with managing inventory levels 
in the aftermarket particularly for low volume and legacy items.  He states that often 
particularly in the automotive industry, a large amount of inventory is invested in and 
this only contributes to a small amount of the profits.  He goes on to observe however 
that simply reducing inventory without consideration of what inventory to take out is not 
the answer.  He gives some case example of companies that have taken a different 
approach to forecasting their aftermarket low volume and legacy components and that 
this different approach has yielded reduced inventories and increased profits.   
Wheatley (2008) notes that standard forecasting techniques using for example the 
normal distribution or percentages based on the size of the fleet are not sophisticated 
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enough and can leave shortages in some parts and overstocking of others.  The author 
recognises that in automotive and aerospace it is not possible to simply stop supporting 
components because it is too difficult to forecast their demand.  One of the cases given 
by Wheatley (2008) is that of Ford, Caterpillar and SAP working together to develop a 
forecasting system for “slow moving and irregular items” (i.e. legacy and low volume 
items).  Wheatley states that Caterpillar have a good background in forecasting low 
volume items due to the nature of their business and that;  “Caterpillar has had 
considerable success applying a compounded extension of the Poisson probability 
distribution (which is specifically designed to handle low-frequency events), as opposed 
to the normal (or bell-shaped curve) distribution commonly used in inventory 
management.” 
 
This idea of having a different forecasting technique for legacy and low volume items is 
an important aspect to consider and something that should be part of any framework for 
managing legacy and low volume parts.  Forecasting was mentioned as an issue in the 
interviews and the questionnaires and so clearly it is a pertinent point for Rolls-Royce. 
 
The above cases have demonstrated that there are different approaches to those 
currently in use by Rolls-Royce for certain elements of the management of legacy and 
low volume parts.  The next section of this report will now review the remainder of the 
interview responses and the questionnaire responses as part of a critical review of the 
current practices in Rolls-Royce for managing legacy and low volume parts. 
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6. The Current Rolls – Royce Processes 
6.1 Background 
This section will seek to evaluate the management of legacy and low volume parts within 
Rolls-Royce by critically evaluating the current processes and departments involved from 
the customer requirement to the provision of components against the findings from the 
literature review and case studies.  This is in line with objectives 4 and 5 as stated in 
section 1.2. 
 
Figure 11 was constructed to depict the departments involved in the management of 
legacy and low volume parts.  This diagram was created based on research done within 
the company and the author’s knowledge.  The aim is to give an overview of the process 
from an order being placed to delivery of a component.  As can be see, the Customer 
Facing Business Units (CFBU) are the link with the end customer and any requirements 
for legacy and low volume components that come from aircraft operators or from repair 
and overhaul bases are directed at the CFBUs.  These requirements are then cascaded to 
the Supply Chain Units (SCUs) via orders in the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
system, SAP, for the individual components required.  These SAP orders are directed at 
the buyer for the particular commodity they are responsible for2.  (Further information on 
SCUs and CFBUs can be found in appendix 10.) 
Figure 11: The flow down of requirements in Rolls-Royce 
 
                                                 
2 Components are grouped into what are termed ‘commodities’ within Rolls-Royce.  These 
are groups of similar components for example, Gears, Bearings, Fan Blades to name a 
few.  Each buyer is responsible for sourcing parts from one or more commodities. 
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These demands will appear on a list, called a ‘work queue’ along with all other 
components for running production and NPI.  Post Production Engine Services (PPES) are 
a part of the services organisation and they are intended as a support function for both 
the CFBU and the SCU. They do also manage some suppliers.  As can be seen from the 
diagram, all requirements whether legacy or new engines cascade the same way.  The 
diagram shows that the CFBU works with the SCU to understand the status of the 
component be that sourcing status or delivery status.  The diagram also shows the there 
are processes supporting all departments, the PILM process already described, the SORB 
process3, the sourcing process and also the parts retirement process.  This is not an 
exhaustive list of processes, however these are considered as the most pertinent to the 
topic of this report.  This is the basic view of the process, however it is sufficient as an 
overview. 
 
The remainder of this section will set out and discuss the results of the research done 
within the company including the interviews and questionnaires and also the author’s 
knowledge, research in the company and discussion with employees from the 
departments.  This research has been analysed and the following sections will set out the 
findings and will focus on the issues highlighted as being a problem with that part of the 
business.  The first part of this section will focus on the CFBU and the customer 
requirements.  The next part will review sourcing and manufacturing of legacy and low 
volume components.  Next the views on the common processes will be discussed and 
finally, the function of the PPES department and the Gas Turbine Services  (GTS) 
organisation will be explored.  In each section, the findings from each of the elements of 
the research will be discussed. 
  
6.2 The CFBU: Capturing and Cascading Customer Requirements 
After analysing the results of the interviews, the questionnaires and other research done 
within Rolls-Royce, there were some common themes identified as issues for the CFBU. 
 
6.2.1 Communication of Requirements 
Firstly it seems that there is a lack of clarity in what is communicated from the CFBUs to 
the SCUs.  One interviewee conceded that often CFBU often places the demand at the 
lead time (as per that set in SAP) and wait for the part to arrive, only expediting it when 
it is late.  This causes additional problems in that once parts are late; much time is then 
                                                 
3 Sales and Operations Review Board (SORB): this is the Sales and Operations Planning 
(S&OP) process for Rolls-Royce. 
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spent by the CFBU tracking each component.  For example in the Marine business there 
are teams of people that sit on link calls on a daily basis tracking the delivery of critical 
late parts.  Currently the Marine business is tracking about twenty critical parts in this 
way.  The feeling was that if more effort was focussed on the sourcing of these parts 
then the manpower requirement in the CFBUs for tracking and monitoring these parts 
would be much lower.  
 
In researching this idea of requirements cascade further the author found that for new 
engine projects being launched, the CFBU issues a Supply Chain Requirement Document 
(SCRD) to the SCUs detailing exactly what is required of the supply chain for that engine.  
This is used as a guide and a reference by the SCU when they are making supplier 
selection decisions.  For the legacy engines this is not something that is done, the 
implication perhaps being that the SCRD was communicated when the engine was 
originally launched.  This seems to be a fairly specific issue for Rolls-Royce as it does not 
match with any of the themes identified in the literature.  The one area where a link 
could be made is that of aligning objectives between departments and this will be 
covered in a later section. 
 
6.2.2 Forecasting 
Forecasting was identified both in the interviews and in the questionnaire responses as a 
contributor to late delivery of legacy and low volume components.  The view from the 
CFBU interviews was that often, they have to over forecast to cover delivery issues in the 
supply chain or to meet the requirement for life-of-type-buys4 and minimum order 
quantities.  All of which drives up the inventory levels and leaves obsolete parts and 
money tied up in working capital. There was the admission that the signal forecasted to 
the supply chain often moves around which can cause uncertainty in the supply chain. 
From the SCU point of view, it was stated by many buyers in response to the 
questionnaire that there is a need for increased accuracy of forecasting aftermarket 
requirements and that customers need to give longer term visibility of requirements so 
the most appropriate sourcing decisions can be made when these parts are required. 
 
While the problems with forecasting are understood, it has to be noted that scheduling is 
difficult for legacy and low volume parts, for example, engines in the Marine business 
may come in after 30 years of being in service and be stripped down for overhaul.  The 
parts used on engines of this age will most likely be old modification standards, in some 
                                                 
4 Agreeing to buy a finite quantity from a supplier to cover all future demands, therefore 
effectively closing the supply chain following the purchase. 
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cases newer versions can be used as replacements but in other cases these older 
standard parts are still required.  This difficulty with forecasting aftermarket legacy and 
low volume parts was noted in the literature review as a common problem for these 
types of parts.  One solution discussed in the case study section was to have a separate 
system to forecast legacy and low volume components because a different approach will 
yield more accurate results.  This is something that should be considered as part of a 
framework on managing legacy and low volume components.  
 
6.2.3 Strategy 
When asked specifically about the strategy for legacy and low volume parts, responses 
were mixed but included one view that operationally, the PILM process asks questions at 
the point of an engine coming to the end of production (gate 4.2).  However there was 
also the view that, while the PILM works once you get to that point in engine lifecycle, 
more work is needed in advance of the engine getting to this point to map out the plan 
for the engine at the earlier lifecycle stage for what will happen when it reaches the later 
stages.  This view that changes are needed was supported with an example that, one 
programme, the 19DD, went through the 4.2 PILM gate and even after a major delivery 
failure investigation, there are still parts on that programme that are un-sourced and 
that are late to the requirement.  It was noted that improvements have been made since 
this instance and for example PPES are looking at a parts retirement policy, which will be 
further discussed later in this section. 
 
From the customer point of view the thought was that the CFBU strategy is not clear on 
what the specific requirements are and what will be supported and until when.  An 
explanation given for this was that when Rolls-Royce strips an engine that has come in 
for analysis on a time and materials basis, the customer will be informed as to how much 
roughly it will cost them to repair.  In some cases they may decide to stop work on the 
repairs, as the cost may be too much.  What happens often then is that Rolls-Royce may 
then negotiate with the customer and reduce the price as it is felt that a profit can still be 
made, albeit eroded due to the lower price deal.  The question has to be asked as to 
whether the full costs of securing a deal are understood, and if this is done with an 
understanding of the true full costs of sourcing the components required to fix the 
engine.   
 
The strategy stated for the services business is to continue to encourage customers to 
purchase the ‘power by the hour’ type service contracts where they pay a set fee per 
month for example and all maintenance is included in this fee (Rolls-Royce, 2011b).  This 
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kind of contract is usually aimed at the newest engines like the Trent 1000, the Trent 
900 and the Trent XWB for example.  For legacy engines, these kinds of agreements are 
less common because TotalCare agreements are with the airline not the aircraft/engine 
therefore they are not necessarily aimed at supporting the whole life of the engine, more 
the life of the engine while the operator with the deal has the engine.  Often operators 
that buy new will often sell off their aircraft after a certain amount of years and at the 
point the engine is acquired by someone else, they will have to get their own 
agreements.  When the engine is older it may not be as cost effective for the new owner 
to take out total care, they may have to go time and materials. 
 
6.2.4 Use of Partners 
Aside from problems identified, there were some other points of interest to note.  Namely 
that in the literature review it was discussed that some companies use a third party to 
look after their legacy and low volume components or their aftermarket requirements. In 
researching this further within Rolls-Royce, it appears that some partners are used in 
certain parts of the business. 
 
In the Helicopters section of the civil aerospace business, Rolls-Royce does make use of 
service providers to support aftermarket requirements.  Aviall is the partner used for 
M250 engines and they support all aftermarket requirements for these engines.  AAR is 
the partner used for the RR300 engine “AAR provides supply chain management 
functions for RR300 spare parts”.  Finally, API supports CTS800 engine spares (Rolls-
Royce, 2011c). 
 
Within the Civil large engines part of the business, Aviall are also now a partner for the 
RB211-524 engine. Rolls-Royce sold their RB211-524 inventory to Aviall and they now 
manage these components for the company.  It was noted in one of the interviews that 
Aviall already cover the aftermarket requirements for the main aircraft that this engine 
fits on, the Boeing 747, therefore this is a good fit for them and makes sense for Rolls-
Royce.  
 
Aviall as part of the deal will be responsible for “forecasting, ordering, and delivering all 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) genuine replacement parts that are unique to 
RB211-524 engines and will assume responsibility for documentation management, 
worldwide inventory deployment, warehousing, and product distribution.” (Flight Global, 
2010). 
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This use of partners in a few small areas is interesting as it could indicate that this is the 
direction the company may wish to proceed in the future.  The deal with Aviall for the 
RB211-524 was only signed in mid 2010 and so this is a fairly recent development for the 
large engines part of the business.   
 
6.3 The SCU: Sourcing and Manufacturing 
The process for demands being placed was briefly outlined above, this section will now 
look at what happens once a demand appears on a buyers work queue.  At present, 
buyers have a sourcing process that they follow which is governed by a Group Quality 
Procedure (GQP).  This is applicable to all components and will not be reviewed in detail 
here. There were a variety of issues highlighted in all elements of the research with 
regards to the SCU. 
6.3.1 Priority and Focus 
Firstly, a common belief expressed in the interviews was that, legacy and low volume 
parts in Rolls-Royce are given lower priority than production and new product 
introduction (NPI) parts within the SCUs. For the respondents this was seen as a 
contributing factor to the poor delivery performance on these parts.  Part of the 
reasoning behind this from the CFBU point of view was that before a part is even 
sourced, when it appears on a buyers work queue the buyer has a 12 week time limit to 
determine if the part is indeed theirs to source or whether it falls under a different 
category of parts looked after by another buyer.  The feeling from the CFBUs was that 
most of the time the part isn’t reviewed until the 12 week point, then it is often passed to 
another SCU who can then take 12 weeks to evaluate it and so on.  This causes 
inevitable delays in sourcing which can be argued to be a contributing factor to late 
delivery from a supplier or plant as time delays in sourcing take up part or all of the lead 
time allowed for the component.  This often means that late delivery may be almost 
inevitable before the component is even sourced.  This delay in the sourcing process was 
felt to be due to a lack of understanding from the SCUs on the importance of sourcing 
these parts in a timely manner due to the profits that can be made from selling them. 
 
In addition, it was stated in an interview that often, legacy and low volume parts are not 
given focus until they are on average six months late to the requirement.  This expedite 
activity that is common on legacy and low volume parts could be argued to be 
detrimental to supplier relationships.  Although not discussed in any of the interviews, 
the fact that often suppliers are asked to produce these parts in lead times far below that 
quoted by them (perhaps due to delays in Rolls-Royce purchasing in sourcing them) and 
also that they may have been persuaded to take on these components as part of a lager 
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package of work, means that it is often inevitable that parts will be late.  In addition, as 
discussed in the literature review, the kinds of practices adopted by purchasing could 
affect the relationship meaning that the supplier has less reason to focus on the part and 
in addition could seek to enter the market directly which is something again that was not 
raised in the interviews but which should be considered by Rolls-Royce. 
 
When the buyers were asked in the questionnaires about the perceived importance of 
legacy and low volume parts, 60% noted that these kinds of parts are generally treated 
as secondary to higher volume production parts and NPI which is in accordance with the 
views expressed by the CFBU as explained above and with the literature as discussed 
previously.  20% did believe that they are treated the same as any other components, 
acknowledging the fact that any late component regardless of its volumes can cost the 
company money.  The remaining 20% noted that priority is determined by the status of 
the parts whether it is p1 or p2, this classification refers to the delivery critical parts 
process which is run centrally by the SCP&C function to track the most critically late parts 
across Rolls-Royce.  This view seems to support the views expressed in the literature and 
in the interviews that legacy and low volume parts are not always accorded the same 
level of importance as other types of parts. 
 
The specific time frames for evaluation are specific to Rolls-Royce but what is common 
with the literature findings is the idea that often aftermarket components are not 
considered as important as new production and are not given the required focus.  
Another link that can be made here is the idea that the purchasing processes need to be 
reviewed to align them to being able to support legacy and low volume components.  
There was no mention in the questionnaire responses or interviews of difficulties with 
supplier relationships on these components and this is perhaps an area that warrants 
further investigation. 
 
6.3.2 Sourcing Processes 
A specific question was asked in the questionnaire about the sourcing processes used for 
legacy and low volume components.  When asked what process they would follow in 
order to source a legacy and low volume parts, the majority of buyers (60%) said that 
they would follow standard sourcing processes, i.e. the quality policy mentioned 
previously.  The remaining 40% said that they have used PPES specific processes like the 
parts retirement policy.  There was the acknowledgement from one of the responses that 
due to the complexity of components in that particular SCU, these kinds of parts would 
generally be sourced as a package along with other higher volume similar parts.  This 
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does show a slight lack of consistency in terms of the approach taken.  What is important 
to note is that in general the sourcing approach is considered to be the same for legacy 
and low volume as for other types of components, there is no specific sourcing process to 
support the different requirements of legacy and low volume arts. 
 
6.3.3 Minimum Order Quantities 
Common responses to the questionnaire regarding specific issues for legacy parts 
included the fact that suppliers often enforce minimum order quantities meaning that 
often Rolls-Royce has to buy more than required and in addition to this, the cost is often 
higher due to the requirement for specialist tooling and other non recurring costs for 
small batches.  The solution to this mentioned by two respondents was that legacy and 
low volume parts are often ‘packaged’ with other higher volume components for 
sourcing, this means that overall the supplier gets an attractive package of work whilst at 
the same time taking on the legacy and low volume parts, this is the case for BR710 
Solid Fan blades which are sourced with BR715/TAY’s.   
 
6.3.4 Quality Problems 
In addition there were quality issues identified including; approvals such as Fixed Process 
Approvals and Documents, First Article Inspection Reports (FAIR) and Last Article 
Inspection Reports (LAIR); these are all Rolls-Royce documents and the main issue 
highlighted was that approvals run out after a certain amount of time meaning that when 
a demand appears for a part it is likely that approvals will need to be renewed as well as 
the supply chains.  In addition other issues include, drawing availability, expired 
manufacturing licences, export licence issues, product definition and process capability.  
Other points were that the machines used for the legacy parts may no longer be 
available, having been decommissioned some time ago, and further to drawing 
availability there may be problems with different measurement systems used on the 
drawings, for example, older drawings may have imperial measurements and there is 
then the task of converting these to metric.  The problem that these technical issues 
cause is that time and resource is needed to rectify them, which is often not available 
due to this resource being directed at the newer engine programmes.  In addition to the 
above, other issues identified were lack of sources to choose from, lack of raw material 
supply and a lack of a forward looking forecast for many parts.  These views again are 
consistent with the findings form the literature on the kinds of problems associated with 
legacy and low volume parts.  What was interesting to note though was that no one 
questioned mentioned the threat from PMA parts or suppliers going direct to the end 
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customer.  This perhaps suggests a lack of appreciation of the implication of the actions 
taken by purchasing.   
 
6.3.5 Raw Material Sourcing 
Something that was not highlighted in the questionnaires but was highlighted in the 
interviews was that problems with legacy and low volume parts are encountered most 
with forged and cast parts, this is because the lead times can be long for forgings and 
castings and in addition if there is a lack of tooling available for the casting or forging this 
could be expensive to procure.  In Rolls-Royce this impacts certain SCUs more than 
others, for example, the Rotatives SCU that manufactures shafts and disks which are 
complex components are thought to be most impacted followed by Turbines and 
Transmissions Structures and Drives.  If a part is machined from sheet or plate metal 
there are not usually as many issues, as sheet metal is a lot easier to source than a 
specific casting or forging.   
 
There is a link that can be made here to the case of the Royal Navy spares discussed in 
the case examples, where suppliers were asked to hold part finished components to 
ensure that lead time commitments could be met for the final component. This kind of 
approach could be useful for the forged and cast parts where total lead times are very 
long.  Clearly the cost of such an approach could be prohibitive although this has to be 
weighed against the cost of not meeting a customer requirements and the damage that 
this can do both financially and to reputation.  Often the problem with sourcing the 
castings and forgings for legacy and low volume components for aftermarket, as with 
quality problems, is that the tooling has been discarded and drawings may not be 
available or may be in a format that cannot be used.   
 
6.3.6 Inventory 
Other factors discussed were those that contribute to problems with inventory 
management.  Firstly, suppliers quote based on minimum batch quantities, which means 
that even though one or two of a component may be required, a larger batch often has 
to be ordered.  This means that often what is ordered is more than the required quantity 
meaning excess inventory.  The factors contributing to suppliers quoting minimum batch 
quantities were summed up by one response which was that, a supplier has to break 
down a machine to set it up for a run of a couple of components versus running large 
batches of components in higher demand which makes this less attractive business and 
also drives up the price of the components.  Therefore cost effectiveness of taking on 
legacy and low volume products for suppliers is also a factor.  Life-of-type-buys were 
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mentioned before and this is another contributor to inventory where sometimes a ‘final’ 
batch will be procured to cover all future requirements before a supply chain is closed.  
There are positives and negatives to such an approach.  It could be expensive to buy all 
of the remaining stock as suggested in section 4.2.2, and this could explain why in many 
cases this does not happen and then when parts are required years later and there is no 
remaining inventory and the tooling is no longer available, a requirement is placed on the 
supply chain.  It is worth questioning whether the cost of holding the inventory is actually 
less than the costs associated with trying to source something for which tooling / 
processes etc no longer exist and all the disruption and management time this requires. 
 
6.3.7 A Common Supply Chain 
It was also widely commented on that the main problem is that supply chains are not 
designed for legacy and low volume. Aftermarket legacy and low volume components are 
predominantly sourced on the same supply chains as higher volume production and NPI 
components both for in-house manufacture and in the external supply chain.  This often 
leads to the need to make priority calls between production, NPI and Aftermarket within 
the same supplier.  The fact that they are sourced in the same supply chain as high 
volume programmes like the Trent 700 and Trent XWB means that suppliers have little 
incentive to focus on the lower volume programmes.  One interviewee felt that due to 
sourcing legacy and low volume components in the same supply chains as other types of 
parts that as a company Rolls-Royce is not agile enough to be able to deal with low 
volume requests in a timely manner.  This was the only reference to agility and the only 
reference that a different kind of supply chain may be needed to cope with legacy and 
low volume demands. 
 
What was not discussed specifically in the interviews and questionnaires but that has 
been witnessed by the author, is that there is an element of disruption caused to a plant 
or supplier when a legacy or low volume component is sourced in the same production 
lines as higher volume components.  Most plants prefer to operate runs of parts to 
minimise time list for tooling changeovers.  Putting through a small batch of a legacy 
components in the middle of runs of larger volume components causes not only set up 
delays but delays while operator re-familiarise themselves with the methods required for 
the older components.   
 
The above highlights that having a common supply chain for legacy and low volume 
components and running higher volume production components cause problems.  This is 
consistent with the findings in the literature, which were that treating the two types of 
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components as being the same when sourcing them is not the right approach as both 
have very different requirements.  If Rolls-Royce were to source legacy and low volume 
components onto supply chains that were designed for legacy and low volume, that is 
those that can adapt to small batch sizes and short lead time requirements, problems 
with inventory, delivery, disruption to the production supply chains and potentially cost, 
could be mitigated.  Therefore this different approach is something that should be key in 
a model for managing legacy and low volume components.  This would be a different 
approach to that taken currently which centres around having components grouped into 
what are termed ‘commodity groups’ these commodities like ‘gears’ ‘shafts’ and ‘blades’ 
cover all of the requirements from NPI to aftermarket and the focus is on finding 
common supply chains for product groupings based on type of part rather than the type 
of requirement against that part. 
 
6.3.8 Strategy 
From a sourcing point of view there is nothing stated explicitly about how the parts 
should be sourced other than following the common processes used for all parts.  This 
was highlighted at the start of this section in figure 11 which demonstrated that all parts 
follow the same route for sourcing. An example was given to illustrate the fact that 
‘strategies’ often emerge in the course of day-to-day operations.  The example was that 
of solid fan blades, the question being what is the strategy for support of legacy and low 
volume variants of these components? The argument could be that when the new 
Singapore large fan blade facility is online and manufacturing the bulk of large Trent 
variants for the newer engines, the existing facility in Barnoldswick could be dedicated as 
legacy and low volume components; in this case it was argued that it is difficult to say 
whether this was the result of a long term strategy or whether it is just an evolving 
situation.   
 
From the authors research and knowledge of the company it is evident that the 
purchasing strategy overall is in line with the general move in industry towards using 
fewer, larger suppliers.  On the newer engine programmes there are many fewer 
suppliers than there would have been on the legacy programmes when they were 
originally launched.  There is much more use of partnerships now, largely in the form of 
Risk and Revenue Sharing Partnerships (RRSPs) mainly due to the large costs associated 
with developing a new engine and the need to share this cost with the supply chain.  
While this is a good approach for new engines, it does mean that as stated previously 
there are fewer suppliers to chose from when a legacy requirement appears often 
because the smaller suppliers are no longer in the business anymore.  There is then the 
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further problem that while these larger suppliers are partners on newer programmes, 
they are not keen to take on legacy business as it disrupts the production flows on the 
larger volume engine components.   
 
Previously Rolls-Royce did have certain plants in the business dedicated to lower volume 
components.  For example, there was the fast response cell located in Barnoldswick, this 
was used for development products and for legacy requirements.  The plant was set up 
so that requirements could be dealt with quickly and meant that the other plants 
producing higher volume components did not have to be disrupted.  Speaking to people 
who used to work in this plant, it appears that the culture and attitude of people within 
the plant were geared towards being flexible and meeting last minute urgent requests. 
This is often in stark contrast to that experienced within the other plants.  This plant was 
closed because it became unviable financially when compared to other plants.  However, 
the question has to be asked as to how this analysis was done and whether the true 
costs of pushing these kinds of requirements into the production plants and the supply 
chains were understood. 
 
6.3.9 Suggestions for Improvements 
When asked if they felt that there could be improvements made to the way these parts 
are sourced, 100% of the questionnaire respondents said that they felt that there were 
improvements that could be made.  Some said that some improvements have already 
been made, like the implementation of some PPES processes like the parts retirement 
policy.  PPES processes were also mentioned but the feeling was that these need to be 
adopted and accepted by the company to reduce the number of such parts that have to 
be sourced. 
 
Some additional suggestions for improvement from the questionnaire responses will now 
be summarised.  Firstly, some mentioned the idea of having a policy on minimum order 
quantities, and in addition to this there would need to be some acceptance that a 
premium may have to be paid for smaller batches.  From a more strategic purchasing 
point of view, the view was that it would be a good idea to ensure suppliers in the 
commodity strategies are aware that there is an expectation/requirement that they take 
some low volume work at acceptable pricing, as well as the regular runners and 
repeaters.  An alternative view given was that the commodity strategies should have 
identified low volume sources so non-attractive and difficult parts can be sourced away 
from the running and repeating parts to avoid disruption to other schedules. This was 
backed up by another comment that suggested that sourcing legacy and low volume 
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parts with high volume parts while logical from an overall package point of view, does 
dilute the cost competitiveness of the volume parts, so an alternative cost effective 
solution would be ideal.   
 
In terms of purchasing day-to-day activity, a comment was that there could be a need 
for administration staff to cover the burden of doing this low value activity (as long as it 
was in line with Commodity Strategy).  However the debate must be had as to whether 
this is actually low value activity as suggested when the legacy and low volume parts can 
make significant profits for the company. In addition to the above, it was suggested that 
combined cross-functional sourcing meetings were required to ensure that the functions 
are working together to find the best overall solution.  Prior to this taking place, it was 
suggested that there is a need to review lead times for legacy parts on SAP to ensure the 
correct lead time is in the system to allow enough time to source and manufacture the 
parts.   
 
6.4 Common Processes 
6.4.1 Objectives and Metrics 
Some factors identified throughout the interviews and questionnaires are common to all 
areas of the business.  For example, it is perceived that there appear to be conflicting 
objectives and metrics between the CFBUs and the SCUs.  One example is around 
financial metrics; from the CFBU point of view, it is recognised that large profits can be 
made from selling legacy and low volume parts above the cost price; therefore, cost to 
purchase from the supply chain is not the main driver in the sourcing decision, rather 
availability to meeting demand in the required batch size is more important.  However 
the SCUs buyers are measured on cost variance to ‘target cost’ and ‘should cost’, 
therefore when they receive quotes back that are very high compared to the original 
price paid, they are penalised in their metrics due to the high cost variance, even though 
the CFBU can make the money back when the component is sold at a profit compared to 
cost.  
 
Another set of metrics where there are different views is delivery metrics.  A problem is 
that there are standard supplier metrics, which do not take into account the different 
requirements of the different types of parts.  In the interviews one respondent said that 
when a part is legacy or low volume, the customer CFBU isn’t necessarily worried about 
delivery measures that target accuracy of a matter of days, generally if a part is 
delivered within 3 months of the requirement that’s acceptable.  Buyers and SCUs are 
driven by these stringent measures.  Standard measures across the business do not take 
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into account the fact that the different CFBUs have different objectives and drivers due to 
the different natures of the businesses. 
 
This conflict of metrics and objectives between the different parts of the business is 
consistent with the findings in the literature review, that having different objectives in 
the different departments and different measure will cause tension and inevitably lead to 
problems.  Therefore any framework for the management of legacy and low volume parts 
must consider the metrics of the individual business areas involved and must seek to 
resolve any conflicts. 
 
6.5 PPES 
Throughout the responses to the questionnaires and interviews, the Post Production 
Engine Services (PPES) department was mentioned frequently.  This section will briefly 
describe this area of the business and its intentions based on the author’s own 
experience, discussions with people who work in the area and research on the intranet 
within Rolls-Royce.  Following this the issues highlighted in the questionnaires and 
interviews will be discussed. 
 
PPES is part of the Gas Turbine Services (GTS) business.  Gas Turbine Services is the 
part of the company responsible for aftermarket services. Services account for 51% of 
revenues to the company (Rolls-Royce, 2011b) and so it is an important area of the 
business.  PPES is a relatively new department in Rolls-Royce that “Supports those 
engines that are no longer in production, engines approaching end of new production, 
and engines in low volume of new production with a non-robust supply chain.” (Rolls-
Royce, 2011a). 
 
As introduced in section 3, the Product Introduction and Lifecycle Management (PILM) 
process is used to manage all engine projects through their lifecycles.  The PPES 
department deals with the engines that are coming up to or are already past gate 4.2 
which is the point at which the engine ceases to be in production and continues only as a 
product supported in the aftermarket.  The set up of PPES is like that of a standard SCU, 
but with an additional leg for strategic improvements that are read across all parts of the 
business.  Any improvement work by PPES is rolled out across the SCUs. In order to 
facilitate this flow down, there are now single points of contact in every SCU, this has 
previously been the Supply Chain Projects Manager (SCPM).  However, in addition to this 
from 2011, there is a Sub System Manager (SSM) in every SCU to deal with legacy 
issues.   
 55 
Figure 12: The Structure of PPES constructed from information from the RR intranet 
(Rolls-Royce, 2011d) 
 
This split between strategic and operational is depicted in figure 12, this was constructed 
based on information from the Rolls-Royce intranet and based on discussions that the 
author had with those working in the PPES department.  The Strategic elements leg of 
PPES is focussed on some key work streams that aim to improve the Rolls-Royce 
approach to managing legacy components; these are summarised in figure 12. 
 
6.5.1 Work Done So Far by PPES 
Work has been done on these improvement workstreams and some key points will be 
discussed now.  Firstly, looking at the issues with prioritisation, work has been done on 
the buyers sourcing work queues.  PPES started to monitor the SCU performance on 
legacy / low volume work queue items, they put in place agreed times that SCUs have in 
which to respond to a legacy demand.  Now that these measures have been put into 
place, the SCUs are being asked to manage and monitor this for themselves.   
 
Another element of sourcing improvements already being made is in the technical 
elements like LAIRs, technical packs and tooling.  These often cause problems for legacy 
parts.  LAIRs have very rarely been carried out and technical packs and tooling are often 
not retained for future use.  
 
PPES have also implemented a rule that means that before loading demands for new 
material, the CFBU should check if there is any Serviceable Used Material (SUM).  There 
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is work on revising the PILM structure.  For legacy parts re-introduction, the desire was 
to mimic as much as possible the NPI process and to treat the parts in the same way. 
Table 2: Categories from the parts retirement process 
 
Some policies have also been written, for example the parts retirement process which is 
intended to guide MRPCs5 and buyers in setting up legacy parts correctly in SAP by 
providing guidelines on different categories of parts.  These categories are shown above 
in table 2.  For active, dormant and retired parts, capability needs to be maintained.  
Interesting to note is that any parts can be re-activated if the business case supports the 
work required to do so. 
 
From a sourcing point of view, as part of these improvement projects, PPES claim that 
they have reviewed all commodities with each SCU to ensure that there is a strategy in 
place for each of the commodities and where a commodity is legacy/low volume only, it 
has been handed over to the PPES team.  The commodities owned by PPES tend to be 
general machining commodities and combustions and casings commodities; there are no 
others from other SCUs. PPES are working with the SCUs to understand all commodities, 
the SCUs have been asked to identify commodities that can be handed over to PPES if 
they only deal with legacy and low volume components.  Out of about 105 total 
commodities, 19 are being looked at by PPES.  It is important to note here that although 
some suppliers are managed by PES, the scope of PPES is not to source all legacy and 
low volume parts, this function remains within the SCUs. 
 
In terms of the manufacturing element and management of the suppliers.  PPES do own 
some suppliers like Unison, Doncasters, JS Chins, Beagle, MB Burnley, MB Motherwell, 
Broadway, AN Tools, P&S Tool.  MB Burley are now paid as an integrator to manage the 
other PPES suppliers.  At the moment they only manage what is given to them, i.e. they 
                                                 
5 Materials Requirements Planning Controllers.  The people that manage parts within SAP 
on a day-to-day basis. 
Category Last Supplied Next Supply Required 
Active  < 2 years On-going 
Dormant with Demand 2 to 5 years Known demand 
Dormant 2 to 5 years No demand 
Retired with Demand > 5 years Known demand 
Retired  > 5 years No demand 
Obsolete  R-R has withdrawn supply No demand 
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do not actively source legacy supply chains themselves.  The diagram in figure 13 shows 
the scope of PPES, it shows that there are some suppliers that it owns, but that for the 
remaining 70% the role for PPES is purely to ensure that the Supply Chain Units are 
managing legacy components properly. “PPES will ensure Rolls-Royce effectively 
manages its low volume supply chain.” (Rolls-Royce, 2011f). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: PPES Commodity Ownership  
(Rolls-Royce, 2011e) 
 
The key points on improvement projects based on the author’s research have been 
discussed and now that this is understood, the issues raised with PPES will be explored.  
As noted above, there were many comments about PPES in the interviews and 
questionnaires.  In general, the strategy and actions of PPES were also discussed as an 
issue contributing to the overall problems.   
 
6.5.2 Support to the Customer 
From the CFBU point of view, one view given during the interviews was that PPES as a 
department do not support the customer as it should do.  An example was given which 
demonstrates a lack of coordination between PPES and the rest of the business.  The 
Marine CFBU worked with the PPES department on the WR21 programme to understand 
the costs to order the required spares material. PPES gave the CFBU some costs, which 
were used to secure funding from the MOD (with no possibility of securing further 
funding from that point).  When the parts appeared on the buyers work queues in the 
SCUs after the physical orders had been placed, the actual costs came in from the buyers 
as being much higher than the CFBU had been told by PPES.  It appears that there had 
been no agreement from the SCUs on the costs transmitted by PPES to the CFBU.  This 
led the CFBU to question the effectiveness of PPES and their role, in fact the interviewee 
noted that in future, they would go direct to the seniors managers in the SCUs rather 
than involving PPES, who are seen as ‘another SCU’.   
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There were positive comments about the work done by PPES, it was noted that the work 
they are doing to improve processes and to introduce new policies to support legacy and 
low volume parts is moving the company in the right direction.  It was also noted by one 
interviewee that they felt that PPES did perform the coordination role well.  However it 
was suggested that PPES are operating more strategically than tactically and 
operationally, and that this means that while they are looking at improvements, they are 
not actually researching and sourcing specific legacy and low volume supply chains and 
they are not actively supporting the SCUs in the sourcing of these components which was 
seen to be the main problem by most of the interviewees. 
 
6.5.3 Legacy and Low Volume Supply Chains 
It was recognised that PPES own some suppliers and that they manage these.  However, 
many of those questioned, had the view that PPES should be more active in sourcing 
legacy and low volume supply chains rather than simply acting as a support function for 
the SCUs.  The view from PPES was that sourcing should stay within the SCUs where 
there is the expertise on the commodities. 
 
The view was that when PPES was first set up, the aim was to set up legacy and low 
volume supply chains, however now they provide support and a ‘toolkit’ to help the SCUs 
to set up these supply chains.  Part of this includes the parts retirement process, 
however the view was that PPES should be looking at ensuring supply chains for parts 
not retiring them, they should also look at offering alternatives to customers, for 
example a different standard of an un-sourced part that is available 
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7. Developing a Framework 
7.1 A Summary of Findings 
The preceding sections have sought to cover objectives 1 – 5 as set out in section 1.2.  
This section will summarise the findings discussed so far to give the overall view, which 
will then be developed into a framework proposal to support objective 6.  Table 3 below 
was constructed based on the analysis undertaken for this study.  The findings have been 
mapped against the business area that they are pertinent to. 
Table 3: A Summary of Key Findings 
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As can be seen from this summary, there are problems identified both in the literature 
and within Rolls-Royce on the management of legacy and low volume supply chains.  
There were also various solutions for some of these problems, although it is important to 
state that there is no one ‘ideal’ solution available for managing legacy and low volume 
supply chains.   
 
The key finding of this report is that Rolls-Royce appears to treat legacy and low volume 
components in the same way as it treats other, high volume, components.  There is no 
distinction in terms of the sourcing processes or the supply chains used.  This is in 
contrast to the findings in the literature that suggest that different types of parts require 
a different approach.  There were four supply chain design models suggested in the 
literature review, McClusky (2004), Lee (2002), Fisher (1997) and Cohen et al (2006). 
 
None of these are specific to legacy and low volume supply chains, however they do offer 
useful pointers and in order to illustrate the differences between the requirements for 
legacy and low volume supply chains and supply chains for high volume components, 
some of the characteristics from these models have been used to analyse the findings.  
This analysis is shown below in table 4 
Table 4: Legacy and Low Volume Supply Chains and Production Supply Chains Compared 
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As can be seen, the characteristics of legacy and low volume components in Rolls-Royce 
and very different to the characteristics of higher volume components.  Legacy and low 
volume components have different demand and supply characteristics and different 
product characteristics.  Looking at this, it would seem logical to say that the two 
component types require a different approach to designing supply chains for them.  
Further to the above, if the two types of components are plotted against Hau Lee’s 
(2002) uncertainty framework, then it could be argues that they would sit in different 
areas of the framework meaning that a different kind of supply chain is required for each.  
This analysis is shown in figure 14 below, which shows legacy components plotted as 
being on the border between risk hedging supply chains and agile supply chains and high 
volume production parts as being plotted against efficient supply chains (high volume 
spares and NPI parts were also plotted on the matrix for comparison).   
 
Figure 14: Legacy and Low Volume and Production Components Plotted Against Hau 
Lee’s (2002) Uncertainty Matrix 
 
The logic behind this is that legacy and low volume components, as noted in table 4 
above, have relatively uncertain demand, some may be planned in but some can come 
from ad hoc requests from customers.  In terms of their supply uncertainty, this is fairly 
high as many of the parts have not been produced for some time and as discussed 
earlier in this report in some cases the tooling or machinery is no longer available, the 
supplier may no longer be in business or as is often the case, the suppliers asked to 
quote may not want to business due to small batch sizes and time lost for set ups and 
the costs associated with this.  This is in contrast to the position of high volume 
production parts, which have a lower demand uncertainty due to the fact that their 
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design is stable and they are being made to support engine build at weekly rates.  The 
supply uncertainty is also lower for production parts as suppliers are contracted to 
support and in many cases there are partnership deals like Risk and Revenue Sharing 
Partners (RRSPs). 
 
7.2 A Reference Framework 
Based on all of the analysis and discussion, figure 15 below depicts a reference 
framework that is intended to provide guidance on legacy and low volume supply chains 
in Rolls-Royce.  The diagram gives suggestions for considerations and areas for 
improvement for dealing with the gaps identified (as summarised in table 3) in the 
management of legacy and low volume supply chains in Rolls-Royce.  This reference 
framework groups together the pertinent improvement suggestions for each business 
area and gives some that span all areas. 
Figure 15: A Suggested Reference Framework for Legacy and Low Volume Components 
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7.2.1 Improvements for the End Customer 
Each of the areas and improvements suggested will be discussed and then a summary 
will be given on the overall priorities.  Starting with the end customer, a suggestion is 
that for legacy and low volume programmes options should be reviewed for the customer 
to finance all or part of the inventory required to support their legacy engine.  Clearly 
this would not be feasible in all cases, however, for some customers for whom support 
for their engines is more critical to them, than it is profitable to Rolls-Royce, it could be 
argued that Rolls-Royce could request that the customer pays towards the cost of 
keeping inventory, this would support either buying an amount of a component as a life-
of-type-buy, or could cover the costs of the disruption caused in the company and the 
supply chains when legacy and low volume components are required.  Along these lines it 
may be worth reviewing options for a type of total care agreement specific to legacy and 
low volume engines or perhaps have a membership club for owners of legacy products 
which would allow access to legacy and low volume spares for a fee which would support 
the costs of sourcing, disruption and holding inventory.  These suggestions are based on 
the various examples from the literature where other parties financed the inventory, and 
are intended to resolve the problems with excess inventory, obsolete parts or the lack of 
inventory to meet a demand because inventory was too expensive to finance. 
 
7.2.2 Improvements for the CFBU 
Moving on to the CFBU, there are six areas suggested as being critical for the CFBU to 
review for legacy and low volume components.  Firstly, to close the gap identified as to 
the lack of a clear strategy for legacy and low volume parts from the CFBU, the overall 
legacy strategy for each engine needs to be developed and made explicit and this should 
be considered right at the start of an engine programme.  Secondly, the requirements, 
based on the strategy, need to be clearly communicated to the SCUs and this dialogue 
needs to be maintained through the life of a project so that as the requirements change 
the SCU is kept informed, this is to close the identified gap that the SCUs do not always 
know what the supply chain requirements are for each legacy engine type.   
 
Cost evaluation is the next point and this refers to the fact that the CFBU should more 
robustly analyse the cost of supporting the legacy products, this is to respond to the 
question raised about which products should be supported based on cost effectiveness. 
Where it is not truly cost effective for Rolls-Royce to support a product, or to provide an 
alternative for cost comparison, other options should be reviewed, for example, as was 
suggested in the case studies, the company could look to use licence manufacture as an 
alternative to producing or sourcing legacy and low volume component, clearly the 
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implications for the management of Intellectual Property would need to be considered, 
however if the right agreement could be made, this could be a viable option.  
Alternatively, Rolls-Royce could review options for using third parties like Aviall for 
example on a more extensive basis.  These kinds of options reduce the amount of time 
and resource required to deal with legacy components, which could help in the long term 
to improve the contribution to cash flow and profits.  Finally, forecasting methods should 
be reviewed and an approach for all legacy engines based on more sophisticated 
techniques should be considered.  The technique used, as discussed in the literature 
review, should be different to that used for high volume production components.  This is 
in line with the thinking in the literature that a different forecasting approach can yield 
benefits in terms of better inventory management and availability of parts for customers 
which all impacts profit and cash flow positively. 
 
7.2.3 Improvements for PPES 
PPES is the next area where changes should be made, the main change being that, in 
line with the thinking in the literature and the thoughts from the interviews and 
questionnaires, Rolls-Royce should look to develop, and PPES are well placed to facilitate 
this for the company.  The role of PPES should be more than just guidance on how the 
SCUs should conduct their day-to-day operations; there should be an active role in the 
setting up of legacy and low volume supply chains.   
 
7.2.4 Improvements for the SCU 
For the SCU there are five aspects to consider, firstly, there is the strategy for legacy and 
low volume components, based on the findings of the research within the company it was 
clear that in many cases there is no specific strategy for the sourcing of legacy and low 
volume components other than to source them in the same supply chains as for 
production.  This ties in with the second suggestion, which is that the SCUs should work 
with PPES closely to develop specific legacy and low volume supply chains where this is 
feasible.   The next suggestion is that the SCUs should review contracts for components 
when they reach the legacy and low volume stage and make sure that goals are aligned 
with the required specific Key Performance Indicators for legacy and low volume 
components, this is in line with suggestions in the literature that a mismatch of goals 
between suppliers and the OEM can cause problems particularly on aftermarket 
components.  As this issue of supplier management and contracts was not highlighted in 
the questionnaires or interviews, it is arguably a gap that needs to be filled.   
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The fourth area to review is supplier intelligence, the SCU should review the actions of 
the suppliers to make sure that any areas of concern are highlighted early, for example if 
the supplier seems to be moving into the PMA parts market.  Again, this was not 
mentioned in any of the interviews or questionnaires and this could be argued as being a 
gap in the current approach in that the focus of purchasing is very internal to the 
company rather than being aware of what is happening in the market.  This needs to be 
rectified because now may suppliers, as discussed in the literature review, see the 
aftermarket as an important growth area of business and if Rolls-Royce is not conscious 
of this they could find that suppliers are taking away business from them.  Another area 
that could be looked at is using specialist sourcing companies, as in the case example in 
section 5 to assist in finding legacy and low volume components, this could help to 
mitigate against the fact that it appeared, based on the research, that knowledge of the 
specific requirements for legacy and low volume supply chains was limited in the 
company.  Finally, it was commented on in the previous section that Rolls-Royce has, in 
the past, run specific plants for low volume production.  While closing such a plant may 
have seemed to be a good financial decision, it could be argued that overall, having a 
plant that is able to respond quickly to last minute demands for small batches of 
components could be invaluable in terms of being able to support the customer and 
maintain the brand image of the company. It is suggested that this is investigated 
further. 
 
7.2.5 Improvements for the Supplier 
The final area is the supplier, firstly, options should be discussed with suppliers which 
involve them holding inventory at the finished and part finished level where this is 
deemed to be a viable solution. As a mitigation to the issue discussed above in section 
6.3.5, that raw material can be difficult to source, an approach could be that when 
production for an engine is coming to an end, a certain amount of forgings and castings 
are purchased and held ready for future spares requirements, this would have to be 
financially assessed and discussions would have to be had with suppliers about who 
would cover the costs of doing so.  In addition, given that the move, as previously 
discussed, has been towards fewer larger suppliers, discussions could be had with these 
suppliers regarding them having their own legacy and low volume cells.  As discussed in 
the case studies, large suppliers like Goodrich see the aftermarket as an area of potential 
growth and therefore they need to support their own products, therefore it seems 
reasonable that they should have the capability to do so.  This should all be reviewed as 
part of the suggestion in the SCU section about aligning supplier and Rolls-Royce goals. 
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7.2.6 Common Areas for Improvement 
Spanning all of these areas are the metrics and measures used.  The improvement 
suggestion here is that these need to be consistent across the different areas of the 
business involved in legacy and low volume supply chains.  While there has been a lot of 
work across the business to have common metrics in areas like quality, cost and 
delivery, it is clear that the measures used under these headings need to be further 
refined to support legacy and low volume.  Table 4 suggests some alternative key 
performance indicators that could be used as a basis for common measurement of 
performance.  These are, under the ‘cost’ measures, for legacy components there should 
be recognition of the profit potential, rather than being penalised for higher cost per unit, 
buyers should focus on the profit that the component could make for the company which 
would marry up with the objective of the CFBU.  ‘Cost to supply’ also needs to be more 
clearly measured, the disruption caused, the time spent on sourcing and the time spent 
on expediting late delivery should be factored into an overall cost estimation of 
supporting a customer request.  On the delivery side, the metrics used to monitor 
suppliers on delivery of legacy and low volume components need to reflect the customer 
requirements, as was suggested in a previous section, a supplier that can deliver even 
within 3 months of a requirement is acceptable for a legacy and low volume components 
where this would not be the case for running production components.    
 
In addition to common metrics, common objectives are required to ensure that all areas 
are driving towards the same goals.  Finally, it is suggested that there is an amount of 
education and training required for all business areas on the different drivers and 
requirements for legacy and low volume supply chains as opposed to higher volume 
production supply chains. 
 
7.3 Framework Usage and Timescales 
The reference model suggested is intended to show that there are improvements that 
could be made in each part of the business involved in legacy and low volume parts.  The 
intention is that this should highlight the importance of considering legacy and low 
volume components in a different light to running production components.   
 
The suggestions given for each of the business area were intended to close the gaps 
highlighted in the current process as discussed in section 6.  All of these suggestions 
should be reviewed for each new legacy and low volume requirement, and the most 
applicable solution based on analysis of the different options should be chosen.  Where 
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no other option exists, only then should the component be sourced in the production 
supply chain. 
 
In terms of timescales and priorities, the aligning metrics and objectives between the 
different business areas should be the first priority.  Education around the different parts 
of the business about the importance of understanding the different supply chain drivers 
should be considered for implementation in the medium term.  Longer term, the 
strategies should be reviewed and aligned, and specific supply chains should be set up 
and supporting all of this the other elements discussed above should be considered. 
 
In order to ensure that the suggested improvements are embedded within the company, 
the points raised in the framework could potentially be incorporated into existing 
processes for example, the PILM gated process.  This could be modified to include 
questions requiring these areas to be considered.  The argument is that if an existing 
process is used there is less disruption to the business and potentially more likelihood 
that the changes would be adopted.  Therefore a further suggestion for future research is 
that the PILM process is further investigated and that the points raised in the framework 
are reviewed for inclusion. 
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8. Conclusions 
 
This report has critically reviewed the management of legacy and low volume parts 
within Rolls-Royce and in doing so has highlighted the importance of these parts to the 
company.  The report has outlined the problems within the company and has highlighted 
the problems faced with legacy and low volume parts in other companies using the 
literature.  On the basis of this, the previous section made suggestions as to what could 
be done to change and improve the management of legacy and low volume parts within 
the company and this was presented in the form of a reference framework.  
 
Limitations have been noted throughout the report, and these must be taken into 
account.  In addition to those already cited, firstly, ideally further time would be spend 
interviewing additional people at different levels of the organisation to gain a broader 
range of views.  Given more time and a broader project scope it would have been useful 
to go into further detail on the PILM process to further investigate this and how it could 
be improved to support legacy and low volume parts further.  A notable limitation to 
highlight is that while the Aftermarket was used as research focus due to the lack of 
specific literature on the subject of legacy and low volume this may not be as applicable 
for low volume production engines like marine or nuclear as it is for the aftermarket low 
volume and legacy and therefore further research would be required in this area. 
 
As with any suggested improvements those in this report need to be reviewed and tested 
within the company, the improvements would have to be considered in the broader 
context of the company, for example setting up a new plant to deal with legacy and low 
volume components has obvious financial implications and at a time where the company 
is already investing heavily in new plants globally, this may not be viable for the 
company overall even though it would be arguably beneficial to the legacy and low 
volume parts side of the business.  
 
While this report has sought to cover as much of the topic of legacy and low volume 
supply chains as possible, there are areas that would merit further research.  Firstly, it 
was suggested that forecasting techniques should be improved.  Due to the scope of the 
project it was not feasible to go into detail on what different techniques are available, 
however this needs to be investigated as part of the follow up work to this report.  
Secondly, further work should be done to establish exactly how the costs of supporting 
legacy products could be measured.  Work should be done to understand how the costs 
of supply chains disruption, time and effort spent and resurrecting tooling and machines 
can be fully captured to show the true cost of supporting a product for the entirety of its 
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life.  Finally, it would also be beneficial to engage with other companies in similar 
industries to understand how they organise their businesses to deal with legacy and low 
volume components.  While an insight into this has been gained through the literature 
and case studies review, firsthand interviews with other companies would aid further 
depth of understanding and could help to share best practice and the development of a 
robust approach for legacy and low volume components.   
 
The suggestion of further usage of third parties, raises a question about core 
competence, that is, if Roll-Royce uses third parties this is usually because something is 
not considered as a core competence for the company.  This is an area that warrants 
further research.  An observation is that decisions on core competence in the company 
seem to be made at the component level, that is, ‘can we make this component or 
source this component’.  However it is the view of the author that a wider view needs to 
be taken, and the question should be, is supporting legacy and low volume components 
in general a core competence for Rolls-Royce? If the view is that it is then as discussed, 
there are improvements that can be made, if not then it is perhaps a better decision to 
bring in third parties with the right kinds of agreements which would free the production 
supply chains to focus on just that; running production. 
 
What is clear is that the issue of legacy and low volume parts will continue to be an 
issue.  The evidence for this can be seen in media reports criticising the UK government 
and the MoD on the way they handle defence spending, and the fact that defence 
budgets have been cut.  Carswell (2007) believes that money is wasted because there is 
an insistence on ‘buying British’ and that there is not enough incentive for companies to 
be more cost effective when dealing with MoD contracts.   Gray (2008) talks about many 
failures of the MoD’s procurement strategies that have led to sub standard equipment 
making its way to the front line. 
 
In addition with the world economy still recovering form the global financial crisis; many 
airlines will keep planes in the air for longer, prolonging their life as much as possible.  
This may mean a greater potential for revenues but also means a pressure on costs as 
customers may start to question the process they are paying for spares.  It could be 
argued that if Rolls-Royce continue to perform poorly with delivery on legacy and low 
volume components, there could be a move towards customers seeking components 
from alternative suppliers directly rather than going through Rolls-Royce, if they found 
components that met their needs they may cut out Rolls-Royce altogether.  
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9. Appendices: 
 
9.1 Appendix 1: Questions Used to Guide Interviews 
 
- Do we have problems with aftermarket legacy and low volume parts in RR? 
- If so, what problems do we have in RR? 
- Are these problems generic or do they differ according to commodity / Sector / 
Other? 
- What factors contribute to these problems? 
- Are aftermarket legacy and low volume parts treated as being different to production 
parts? 
- Is there a specific strategy for aftermarket legacy and low volume parts?  
 
o Is there a clear distinction between what is considered an ‘aftermarket’ supply 
chain and what is considered a ‘NPI” or ‘Production’ supply chain 
o Do we pool inventory between repair bases? 
- If so, what is the strategy going forwards? 
- Is work on aftermarket legacy and low volume parts coordinated across businesses / 
sectors?  
- Is there enough focus on considering the aftermarket at the very start of an engine 
programme? 
- Are the links between the different parts of the business e.g. sales, purchasing and 
production adequate to facilitate the functioning of the aftermarket supply chains? 
- How important are aftermarket legacy and low volume parts to the company?  
- Should we continue to manage these components? 
- Should there be a cut off point at which we no longer support legacy 
- Do PPES support the SCUs in defining their aftermarket strategy? 
- Do PPES set up specific aftermarket supply chains? 
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9.2 Appendix 2: Interview Notes  
 72 
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9.3 Appendix 3: Buyers’ Questionnaire 
 
1. How often do you have to source / manage a part that could be classed as legacy / 
low volume? 
2. When sourcing / managing a legacy/ low volume parts what process do you follow? 
3. Are these parts seen as a priority? Are they treated in the same way as an NPI, 
production or higher volume spares item? 
4. Do you encounter any specific problems when sourcing legacy/low volume parts?  If 
so please list / explain / Give any examples 
5. Do you think that there could be improvements made in the way these parts are 
sourced/ handled? 
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9.4 Appendix 4: Notes from Responses to the Buyers Questionnaire 
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9.5 Appendix 5: “6 Steps for Managing Service Networks”  
(taken from Cohen et al (2006) p133) 
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9.6 Appendix 6: Criteria for The SLM Model (McClusky,2004) 
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9.7 Appendix 7: Common methods for increasing responsiveness 
 
 Table 1: Common methods for increasing responsiveness  
 
 
Area Detail 
Physical Logistics  - Place Warehouses close to customers 
- Sharing Warehouses / Transport 
- Fast and Effective Transport System 
- Contingency plans 
Inventory - Strategic Components 
- Location 
- Consignment Stock 
- Strategic Buffers 
Sourcing - Shorter Supply Chains 
- Regional Sourcing 
Design - Reduce Lead time for design 
- Design for manufacture 
- Modularisation of the product 
Demand Forecasting - Improve Forecasting accuracy 
- Monitor customer behaviour 
Customisation - Level of customisation / Standardisation 
- Location of the de-coupling point 
Information - Sharing information with the supply chain 
- IT Systems 
Performance Measures - Linked across the supply chain 
- Linked across departments and functions 
Strategy - Supply chain strategy integrated with 
corporate strategy 
- All functional strategies aligned 
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9.8 Appendix 8: The Benefits of Benchmarking  
(Taken from Lewis & Naim,1995) 
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9.9 Appendix 9: Strategic Sourcing Definition  
(Taken from Rossetti & Choi, 2005) 
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9.10 Appendix 10: Rolls Royce Organisation CFBUs and SCUs  
 
Supply Chain Units (SCUs) 
 
These are the part of the business that deals with the design, sourcing and 
manufacturing of components.  They have representatives from all functions as can be 
seen in the diagram below.  The SCU has the interface with the suppliers and the 
manufacturing plants. 
 
 
 
 
 
The SCUs are: 
- Rotatives 
- Turbines 
- Transmissions Structures and Drives 
- Fans 
- Compressors 
- Installations and Controls 
- General Machining 
- Combustion and Casings 
  
 
Customer Facing Business Units (CFBUs) 
 
These are the part of the business that deals with end customer.  CFBUs manage the 
relationship with the companies buying the products from Rolls-Royce.  So for the Civil 
large engines part of the business, they deal with Airbus and Boeing and also with the 
airlines. 
 
The CFBUs are: 
- Civil 
- Defence 
- Marine 
- Energy 
- Nuclear
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